California Legal Brief

The Rule of People v. Newt is that "receiving" a large-capacity magazine under Penal Code section 32310(a) requires evidence beyond mere possession, specifically evidence as to the provenance of the magazine (such as that defendant bought or received it after January 1, 2000, from someone who manufactured, imported, kept for sale, offered for sale, gave, or lent it), under circumstances where the prosecution seeks a felony conviction for "receiving" rather than a misdemeanor conviction for "possessing" under subdivision (c).

The Rule of In re J.H. is that victims have the constitutional and statutory right to present victim impact statements at juvenile court six-month review hearings under section 875, and courts may consider such statements when limited to components relevant to the minor's rehabilitation and empathy development, under circumstances where a juvenile's baseline confinement term is being reviewed for potential reduction.

The Rule of Armstrong v. Superior Court is that Penal Code section 1000.7 grants probation departments, not trial courts, the authority to determine whether defendants meet statutory criteria for young adult deferred entry of judgment programs, under circumstances where the Legislature has explicitly assigned this determination to the probation department through clear statutory language.

The Rule of Bair v. California Department of Transportation is that res judicata bars relitigation of a CEQA environmental analysis's substantive adequacy when the trial court has discharged a writ of mandate directing preparation of that analysis, under circumstances where petitioners challenged the agency's compliance with the writ in multiple simultaneous proceedings but failed to appeal the writ discharge order.

The Rule of Steven N. v. Priscilla C. is that a voluntary declaration of parentage (VDOP) is void as a matter of law when, at the time of signing, a third party is already a presumed parent under Family Code section 7611, subdivision (b), even if that presumed parent status arises from an invalid marriage solemnized in apparent compliance with law.

The Rule of In re E.J. is that Penal Code section 29820, which prohibits minors adjudged wards of the juvenile court for specified offenses from possessing firearms until age 30, is facially constitutional under the Second and Fourteenth Amendments, under circumstances where the prohibition is based on a prior juvenile adjudication for qualifying criminal conduct.

The Rule of Guinnane Construction Co. v. Chess is that the tort of another doctrine does not permit recovery of attorney fees incurred in litigating against the tortfeasor to recover fees awarded as damages, under circumstances where the plaintiff seeks to recover fees spent pursuing the tort action itself rather than fees incurred in third-party litigation necessitated by the tort.

The Rule of Independent Office of Law Enforcement Review and Outreach v. Sonoma County Sheriff's Office is that Government Code section 25303.7 grants mandatory subpoena power to all sheriff oversight entities established by counties, under circumstances where the county has elected to create such an oversight entity within the meaning of the statute.

The Rule of Cleare v. Superior Court is that a school district cannot invoke the impossibility doctrine to excuse non-compliance with statutory teacher credentialing requirements until it has exhausted all available statutory remedies including seeking waivers from the Commission on Teaching Credentialing or State Board of Education, under circumstances where the district uses long-term substitutes beyond statutory limits instead of permanent credentialed teachers.

The Rule of Pechkis v. Trustees of the California State University is that an anti-SLAPP motion to strike entire causes of action fails when the defendant does not identify with specificity how each claim underlying the causes of action arises from protected activity, under circumstances where the causes of action contain both protected and unprotected conduct.

The Rule of Chi v. Department of Motor Vehicles is that a DMV hearing officer does not violate due process by introducing evidence and ruling on objections when acting as a neutral fact-finder rather than as an advocate, under circumstances where the DMV has expressly instructed hearing officers to act impartially and not advocate for the department.

The Rule of People v. Tzul is that a defendant's handwritten note found at a crime scene stating he found victims "having sex" and that this "fills me with rage" is admissible as circumstantial evidence of the defendant's state of mind for provocation defense, under circumstances where the statement about what defendant observed is not hearsay when offered to show defendant's belief rather than truth of the observation, and the statement about defendant's emotional reaction is admissible hearsay under Evidence Code section 1250's state-of-mind exception.

The Rule of People v. Taft is that when calculating presentence custody credit for noncontinuous periods of custody, the total days of actual confinement must be aggregated first, and then matching conduct credit calculated on that total, under circumstances where a defendant served time before probation was granted and additional time after probation was violated.

The Rule of Sheerer v. Panas is that a trial court must include all bonus income and restricted stock units (RSUs) in calculating child support under the uniform statewide guideline formula, under circumstances where a parent receives such variable compensation and the court has not made proper findings to deviate from the presumptively correct guideline amount.

The Rule of Clapkin v. Levin is that a cross-complaint does not arise from protected litigation activity under Code of Civil Procedure section 425.16 when the claims are based on the defendant's unprotected business conduct that supplies the elements of liability, even where the cross-complaint references prior litigation for context and evidence, under circumstances where the same dispute would exist absent the litigation activity.

The Rule of Torres v. Munoz is that a court abuses its discretion by citing and relying on fictitious case authorities in its order, but a party forfeits the right to challenge such error when the party's own counsel drafted and submitted the order containing the fabricated citations without objecting or alerting the court to the fictitious nature of the authorities, under circumstances where the party had opportunity to verify citations and speak up before the court signed the order.

The Rule of People v. Valencia is that warrantless entry into a home during hot pursuit of a fleeing felon is justified by exigent circumstances when officers are pursuing a suspect who committed a dangerous felony and poses ongoing risks to public safety, and once lawfully inside, police need not obtain a warrant to continue addressing an evolving standoff situation, under circumstances involving a high-speed chase ending at the suspect's residence followed by barricading and armed resistance.

The Rule of John Doe v. Regents of the University of California is that students accused of sexual misconduct in university disciplinary proceedings have no absolute right to cross-examine accusers at a hearing when they have already had a meaningful opportunity to cross-examine those accusers under oath in related criminal proceedings, under circumstances where the university follows its own procedures and the decision-maker has access to sworn testimony transcripts from the criminal case.

The Rule of People v. Nelson is that a trial court may properly deny mental health diversion when it finds as trier of fact that the defendant's mental health disorders were not a significant factor in the commission of the charged offenses, under circumstances where the court expressly rejects expert testimony linking mental illness to criminal conduct and finds the defendant poses a public safety risk based on extensive criminal history.

The Rule of Las Posas Valley Water Rights Coalition v. Ventura County Waterworks District No. 1 is that in a comprehensive groundwater adjudication, trial courts may allocate water rights directly to overlying landowners rather than to mutual water companies when the companies act as agents/trustees exercising rights on behalf of shareholders and the landowners retain their underlying overlying water rights, under circumstances where substantial evidence shows the landowners never severed their water rights through written transfer and the companies do not assert exclusive rights against their shareholders.

The Rule of Physicians for Social Responsibility – Los Angeles v. Department of Toxic Substances Control is that attorney fees cannot be awarded under the catalyst theory where a party has received a final adverse judgment on the merits before the defendant voluntarily provides the relief originally sought, under circumstances where the voluntary action occurs after the lawsuit has been fully litigated to a final judgment against the fee-seeking party.

The Rule of Harrington v. Housing Authority of Riverside County is that under Code of Civil Procedure section 1094.5, a trial court conducting independent judgment review must determine whether the agency's factual findings are supported by the evidence, not independently find facts to support the agency's ultimate decision, under circumstances where fundamental vested rights like Section 8 housing assistance are at stake.

The Rule of Ehrenkranz v. San Francisco Zen Center is that the ministerial exception does not bar wage-and-hour claims by ministers against religious organizations absent evidence that such claims raise an ecclesiastical concern, under circumstances where the claims seek only lost or unpaid wages for work performed as part of the religious organization's commercial activities and adjudication requires no inquiry into ecclesiastical matters.

The Rule of Benjamin Woodhouse v. The State Bar of California et al. is that trial courts have inherent authority to dismiss complaints that assert fantastic, delusional, or fanciful scenarios that have no arguable basis in law or fact, and may declare such plaintiffs vexatious litigants, under circumstances where the complaint presents allegations that no reasonable person would classify as within the realm of possibility.

The Rule of Bartholomew v. Parking Concepts is that collecting and maintaining individuals' ALPR information without implementing and making public the statutorily required policy harms these individuals by violating their right to know, under the California Automated License Plate Recognition Law (Civil Code sections 1798.90.5-1798.90.551).

The Rule of People v. Morgan is that assault is not a lesser included offense of resisting an executive officer by use of force or violence under Penal Code section 69(a), under circumstances where the defendant's forceful resistance does not require a "present ability" to commit violent injury as required for assault.

The Rule of People v. Gonzalez is that Assembly Bill No.

The Rule of J.S. v. D.A. is that indigent inmates in bona fide civil actions that threaten their interests have a right to meaningful access to the courts to be heard in their defense, and trial courts must address and rule on such requests before proceeding without the inmate, under circumstances where an incarcerated defendant requests court assistance to participate in proceedings and the court has notice of the incarceration.

The Rule of In re Christian V. is that a juvenile case becomes final for Estrada retroactivity purposes when the time to appeal the dispositional order expires or direct review is exhausted, regardless of whether the minor remains on probation or whether subsequent post-judgment orders are entered, under circumstances where the minor did not timely appeal the original dispositional order.

The Rule of Jogani v. Jogani is that an expert's undisclosed opinion regarding lost profits cannot be admitted at trial without prior disclosure, under circumstances where the opinion concerns a specific damages calculation ($1.98 billion in alleged lost investment profits) that was never disclosed in discovery.

The Rule of Jazmin Ayala-Ventura v. The Superior Court of Fresno County is that an employment arbitration agreement with potentially broad scope and indefinite duration is not substantively unconscionable when the employer's limited business operations restrict the realistic range of non-employment claims that could arise, under circumstances where the agreement provides mutual arbitration obligations, neutral arbitration procedures, and accessible dispute resolution terms.

The Rule of Flareau is that a trial court abuses its residual discretion when denying mental health diversion based on finding that other factors were "more" motivating than the defendant's mental disorder, under circumstances where the defendant is eligible for diversion and the mental disorder was at least a contributing factor to the offense.

The Rule of The People v. T.B. is that "no less onerous alternatives" in Penal Code section 2679(b) refers to medical alternatives to the proposed organic therapy, not to alternative procedural methods of obtaining consent, under circumstances where an inmate patient lacks capacity to consent to electroconvulsive therapy and the court must authorize nonconsensual ECT.

The Rule of *People v. Alston* is that under Code of Civil Procedure section 231.7, a trial court must expressly explain its reasons on the record when ruling on an objection to a peremptory challenge, including making findings on whether presumptively invalid reasons were rebutted by clear and convincing evidence, under circumstances where the prosecutor's stated reasons for the challenge include distrust of law enforcement by a prospective juror who is a member of a cognizable group.

The Rule of People v. Dixon is that grand jury proceeding transcripts and police reports containing witness statements are inadmissible at Penal Code section 1172.6 evidentiary hearings, under circumstances where the defendant had no opportunity to cross-examine witnesses and the documents constitute multiple levels of hearsay without applicable exceptions.

The Rule of People v. Flores is that an electronics search condition for probation is constitutional and reasonable when the defendant used electronic devices as integral tools in the commission of the underlying offense, under circumstances where the defendant used internet-based platforms and VOIP technology to facilitate drug sales and conceal their identity.

The Rule of The People v. Zapata is that when a suspect invokes and does not waive the right to counsel, and a known law enforcement officer continues to "stimulate" a Perkins operation in a manner that amounts to a custodial interrogation, the suspect's resulting incriminating statements are inadmissible, under circumstances where the known officer's actions were reasonably likely to elicit an incriminating response and created a police-dominated atmosphere of compulsion.

The Rule of In re Marriage of Danielle and Lewis Allen is that parents are precluded from contractually waiving or forgiving past due child support arrearages even after the child has reached the age of majority and there is no longer a current support order in place, under circumstances where the obligor seeks to enforce an accord and satisfaction agreement for less than the full arrearage amount.

The Rule of Bartholomew v. Parking Concepts, Inc. is that collecting and using license plate information through an automated system without implementing and making publicly available the statutorily required usage and privacy policy constitutes "harm" under the ALPR Law sufficient to state a cause of action, under circumstances where an entity operates cameras and computer algorithms to automatically read and convert license plate images into computer-readable data.

The Rule of Fuentes v. Empire Nissan, Inc. is that a contract's format and illegibility generally do not support substantive unconscionability, but courts must closely scrutinize difficult-to-read contracts for unfair or one-sided terms when high procedural unconscionability exists, under circumstances where an employment arbitration agreement is presented in nearly illegible tiny print with minimal time for review.

The Rule of Navellier v. Putnam is that parties to an appeal must promptly notify the appellate court of any bankruptcy filing that "could cause or impose a stay" of proceedings, even if they believe the stay does not apply, under Local Rule 21's mandatory disclosure requirements.

The Rule of People v. Heaps is that ex parte communications with a deliberating jury concerning a juror's ability to deliberate require reversal unless the prosecution proves harmless error beyond a reasonable doubt, under circumstances where the trial court fails to notify counsel of the jury's note raising competency concerns and the record does not establish how the jury resolved those concerns.

The Rule of Navellier v. Putnam is that appellate counsel must promptly notify the court of any party's bankruptcy that could potentially cause a stay under Local Rule 21, regardless of counsel's belief about whether the stay actually applies, under circumstances where the attorney knows about the bankruptcy filing.

The Rule of Brown v. Department of Motor Vehicles is that the Department of Motor Vehicles is not required to disclose the identity of a third-party reporter who initiates a driver reexamination proceeding, under circumstances where the reporter's form merely initiates the process but is not relied upon for the ultimate license suspension decision, the driver receives notice and hearing opportunities, and disclosure of the reporter's identity would compromise road safety by deterring future reports.

The Rule of People v. Aguilar is that a prosecutor's peremptory challenge based on alleged "juror confusion" is presumptively invalid under Code of Civil Procedure section 231.7, subdivision (g)(1)(C), and requires the trial court to confirm that the asserted confused behavior actually occurred based on the court's own observations, under circumstances where the prospective juror is perceived as a member of a protected group and gives clear, consistent answers regarding the legal concept in question.

The Rule of People v. Gomez is that use of animal imagery in criminal proceedings does not violate the Racial Justice Act when the animal reference is benign, endearing, and used solely to explain legal concepts rather than to dehumanize or exhibit racial bias, under circumstances where an objective observer would understand the comparison relates to the state of evidence rather than character traits.

The Rule of Viani v. Fair Oaks Estates, Inc. is that a costs judgment entered after a nonappealable voluntary dismissal without prejudice is not appealable as a final judgment when the appellant seeks to challenge underlying orders rather than the costs determination itself, under circumstances where allowing the appeal would constitute impermissible back-door review of nonappealable orders.

The Rule of Department of Water Resources v. The Metropolitan Water District of Southern California is that a state agency's definition of a proposed program must be sufficiently definite to ascertain whether it qualifies as a statutory "modification" of an existing authorized project rather than a new unit requiring separate legislative approval, under circumstances where the agency seeks to validate revenue bonds based on broad definitional language that fails to establish clear boundaries or purposes for the proposed facilities.

The Rule of In re Lynex is that to obtain appointed counsel under the California Racial Justice Act, an indigent habeas petitioner need only plead a "plausible allegation" of a violation of Penal Code section 745(a), which is an "extremely low" and "minimal pleading requirement" that does not require a prima facie showing of entitlement to relief, under circumstances where the petitioner seeks counsel to prosecute racial bias claims in criminal proceedings.

The Rule of People v. Dixon is that grand jury proceeding transcripts are not admissible under Penal Code section 1172.6(d)(3)'s hearsay exception for evidence previously admitted at a prior hearing or trial, under circumstances where the Legislature used specific statutory language referring to "hearings" and "trials" while grand jury proceedings are designated as "proceedings" or "sessions" in the statutory scheme and lack adversarial safeguards.

The Rule of Zenith Insurance Company v. Workers' Compensation Appeals Board is that equitable tolling of the 60-day deadline under former Labor Code section 5909 cannot justify the Workers' Compensation Appeals Board's 20-month delay in issuing a decision on reconsideration after granting a petition for "further study," under circumstances where the Board failed to demonstrate reasonable and good faith conduct in attempting to comply with statutory procedures.

The Rule of Microsoft Corporation v. Superior Court of Los Angeles County is that a trial court may issue a nondisclosure order prohibiting an electronic service provider from notifying its enterprise customer of a search warrant's existence, under circumstances where the court has reviewed a sealed affidavit and found that disclosure could cause adverse results enumerated in CalECPA, even when the provider proposes to notify only a "trusted contact" at the customer organization who is not the target of the investigation.

The Rule of Spring Oaks Capital SPV, LLC v. Fowler is that a party who fails to properly disclose witness names and addresses in response to a Code of Civil Procedure section 96 request cannot call that undisclosed witness at trial, under circumstances where the responding party only provided the witness's role without specific name identification and the requesting party properly objected.

The Rule of People v. J.C. is that the firearm prohibition under Penal Code section 29820, subdivision (b), does not apply to minors adjudicated as juvenile court wards for brandishing an imitation firearm under Penal Code section 417.4, under circumstances where section 417.4 is not among the statutorily enumerated offenses in section 29805 that trigger the firearm ban.

The Rule of Parsonage v. Wal-Mart Associates, Inc. is that ICRAA authorizes consumers to recover the statutory sum of $10,000 as a remedy for a violation of their statutory rights, without any further showing of concrete injury or adverse employment decision, under circumstances where an employer fails to comply with any requirement of ICRAA's disclosure and consent provisions.

The Rule of Hatlevig v. General Motors LLC is that a motion for attorney fees must be served within 180 days of when a case is voluntarily dismissed pursuant to court order, even when no formal dismissal order is filed until a later date, under circumstances where the case was deemed dismissed by operation of court rules after settlement.

The Rule of Disney Platform Distribution v. City of Santa Barbara is that a municipal ordinance imposing a tax on video services applies to internet video streaming services when the ordinance uses "channel" in its ordinary meaning as a "programming source" rather than in the technical sense of a "transmission path," under circumstances where the ordinance was approved by voters to modernize and technologically neutralize video service taxation.

The Rule of Bishop v. San Diego County Employees Retirement Association is that a public employee suffers a "conviction" within the meaning of Government Code section 7522.74 when the employee pleads guilty to or is found guilty of a job-related felony, regardless of whether the court later reduces the offense to a misdemeanor under Penal Code section 17(b), under circumstances where the employee pleaded guilty to a felony charge before any reduction occurred.

The Rule of Semaan v. Mosier is that court-appointed receivers are protected by quasi-judicial immunity for their discretionary acts and decisions made in their capacity as receiver, under circumstances where the receiver must exercise judgment or discretion in performing their judicial functions.

The Rule of Monroe is that a state employee who service retires while under investigation for misconduct is ineligible for disability retirement benefits because the service retirement constitutes a complete severance of the employer-employee relationship, eliminating the necessary prerequisite for disability retirement—the right to return to service, under circumstances where the employee's departure was not related to a disabling medical condition and occurred during misconduct proceedings.

The Rule of Dion v. Weber is that under the Victims of Corporate Fraud Compensation Fund statutory scheme, trial courts are precluded from relitigating the merits of underlying fraud judgments when evaluating payment claims from the fund, under circumstances where the Secretary of State denies payment based on challenges to the validity of the original fraud judgment.

The Rule of People v. Perez is that impoundment of a legally parked vehicle solely to prevent future unlawful driving by an unlicensed driver does not satisfy the Fourth Amendment's community caretaking function, under circumstances where the vehicle poses no present danger to public safety or traffic flow.

The Rule of 360 So Reeves, LLC v. Jeff Dutton is that a lessor's noncompliance with Civil Code section 1962 is an affirmative defense for which the lessee bears the burden of proof, under circumstances where a successor landlord allegedly failed to provide proper notice of change of ownership and service of process information to a residential tenant.

The Rule of Melissa I. Aerni et al. v. RR San Dimas, L.P., et al. is that Civil Code section 1940.1 does not require individualized proof that each plaintiff used a residential hotel as their own primary residence, under circumstances where plaintiffs seek class certification for violations of the statute's prohibition against the "28-day shuffle."

The Rule of Albarghouti is that the California False Claims Act creates a 60-day default sealing period, after which the seal lifts automatically absent the government's request for an extension, under circumstances where a qui tam plaintiff files the complaint in camera, serves the Attorney General by certified mail, and the government neither requests a seal extension nor provides notice of its intervention decision within 60 days.