California Legal Brief

The Rule of People v. Mitchell is that defendants who agreed to upper term sentences as part of plea bargains may seek retroactive application of Penal Code section 1170(b)'s amended jury trial requirements to their nonfinal judgments, under circumstances where the defendant did not validly waive the later-created statutory rights at the time of the original plea.

The Rule of Department of Human Resources v. California Correctional Peace Officers Association is that an arbitrator does not exceed their powers by issuing an award that offsets an SPB-approved disciplinary suspension when the award is based on violations of the Dills Act and MOU protections for union activity, under circumstances where the SPB reviewed the disciplinary action for cause under the Civil Service Act while the arbitrator separately reviewed whether the same discipline constituted unlawful retaliation for protected activities.

The Rule of Sargenti v. City of Long Beach is that a public entity lacks constructive notice of a dangerous condition when the only evidence of the condition's duration is an unauthenticated Google Street View screenshot, and serving amended interrogatory responses that correct factual errors does not automatically create a triable issue of material fact on summary judgment, under circumstances where the moving party corrects inadvertent errors in discovery responses and the opposing party fails to provide admissible evidence disputing the corrections or authenticating photographic evidence.

The Rule of People v. Wilmot is that a trial court commits prejudicial error when it modifies a CALCRIM jury instruction to require that a killing be "unintentional" for voluntary manslaughter, under circumstances where the modification incorrectly suggests that an intentional killing in the heat of passion cannot qualify as voluntary manslaughter.

The Rule of J.N. et al. v. Jeffrey Goldberg is that a motion for Code of Civil Procedure section 128.7 sanctions must comply with statutory notice requirements by specifying the hearing date in the initial notice of motion to trigger the mandatory 21-day safe harbor period, under circumstances where the superior court's electronic Court Reservation System makes it impossible to obtain a hearing date more than three days in advance but the safe harbor period requires 21 days.

The Rule of Cardenas v. Los Angeles Unified School District is that appellate arguments are forfeited when the opening brief cites only to trial court briefing that itself contains no record citations, under circumstances where the appellate brief fails to provide direct citations to record evidence supporting factual assertions.

The Rule of People v. Morris is that under Penal Code section 189, subdivision (e)(2), a nonkiller defendant must aid or abet the actual killer in the lethal act itself, not just the underlying felony, under the amended felony-murder rule where the defendant acted with intent to kill.

The Rule of People v. Berch is that felony false imprisonment based on menace does not require a threat to inflict force that is greater than necessary to effectuate restraint on a person's liberty, under circumstances where menace involves a threat to inflict injury upon another person.

The Rule of People v. Moss is that a trial court may reimpose an upper term sentence during Penal Code section 1172.75 resentencing without additional jury findings or defendant stipulation to aggravating factors, under circumstances where the defendant was originally sentenced to an upper term.

The Rule of Garcia-Rojas v. Franchise Tax Board is that a nonresident sole proprietor engaging in only one business activity cannot constitute a "unitary business" for purposes of California taxation under regulation 17951-4(c), under circumstances where the taxpayer operates a single-activity sole proprietorship receiving compensation from one entity, even when that entity's clients are located both within and outside California.

The Rule of People v. Lopez is that defendants who petition for resentencing under Penal Code section 1172.6 are not categorically ineligible for relief merely because they could have challenged allegedly ambiguous jury instructions on direct appeal from their original conviction, under circumstances where the petitioner alleges they were convicted under a now-invalid theory of imputed malice due to instructional ambiguity.

The Rule of In re Kowalczyk is that trial courts may only deny bail in noncapital cases for offenses specified in California Constitution article I, section 12, subdivisions (b) and (c), and when setting monetary bail, must generally set it in an amount that is reasonably attainable for the defendant based on an individualized assessment of the totality of circumstances, under circumstances where pretrial detention is not warranted under section 12 subdivisions (b) or (c).

The Rule of The Chemical Toxin Working Group is that Proposition 65's 60-day pre-suit notice substantially complies with regulatory requirements when it provides the name and contact information of the noticing entity's outside counsel rather than a responsible individual within the noticing entity, under circumstances where the notice otherwise identifies the alleged violation with sufficient specificity to enable prosecuting agencies to assess the claim and allow violators to cure violations.

The Rule of People v. Mohammed is that trial courts lack inherent jurisdiction to correct unauthorized sentences once judgment is final and execution has begun, under circumstances where the defendant has not timely appealed and the court acts solely based on the unauthorized sentence rule.

The Rule of Raptors Are the Solution v. CropLife America is that trade associations that intervene in litigation to protect their members' direct pecuniary interests in government registration decisions are "opposing parties" liable for private attorney general fees under Code of Civil Procedure section 1021.5, under circumstances where the intervenors actively participate in defending challenged government approvals that directly affect their members' economic interests.

The Rule of People ex rel. Yolo-Solano Air Quality Management District v. Spencer Defty is that a cross-complaint challenging the validity of an internal agency policy does not arise from protected activity under the anti-SLAPP statute when the regulatory enforcement actions are merely evidence of the policy's application rather than the basis for liability, under circumstances where the cross-complaint seeks declaratory relief that the policy was adopted without proper rulemaking procedures.

The Rule of Shear Development Co. v. California Coastal Commission is that courts must exercise independent judgment in determining an agency's appellate jurisdiction when that jurisdiction depends primarily on interpretation of enacted law rather than factual matters, and where two agencies offer conflicting interpretations of a law both administer, no deference is due to either when the Yamaha factors do not clearly favor one interpretation, under circumstances where jurisdictional disputes turn on legal interpretation of local coastal programs and multiple agencies share administrative responsibility.

The Rule of Jessica M. is that section 3051's youth offender parole provisions do not unconstitutionally amend an initiative statute when the initiative made only technical restatements and clarifications to existing sentencing provisions without substantive changes, under circumstances where the challenged statutory provisions were not integral to accomplishing the electorate's goals in enacting the initiative.

The Rule of Shear Development Co. v. California Coastal Commission is that courts must exercise independent judgment when reviewing an agency's jurisdictional determinations based on legal interpretation of enacted law, and when two agencies offer conflicting interpretations of law they both administer, neither receives deference if Yamaha factors do not clearly favor one over the other, under circumstances where the jurisdictional question depends primarily on statutory or LCP interpretation rather than factual disputes.

The Rule of People v. Hardy is that assault weapons, short-barreled shotguns, large capacity magazines, and silencers are not protected "arms" under the Second Amendment, and regulations requiring firearm transfers through licensed dealers do not meaningfully constrain the right to keep and bear arms, under circumstances where defendants mount facial constitutional challenges to California's firearms restrictions.

The Rule of People v. C.F. is that trial counsel renders ineffective assistance when failing to request a no-cost court reporter for a hearing on involuntary antipsychotic medication, under circumstances where the hearing provides the sole evidentiary basis for the court's order and the failure to secure a reporter is tantamount to waiver of the right to appeal.

The Rule of Dawadi v. Adhikari is that check memo line annotations do not constitute sufficient written acknowledgment to revive a time-barred debt, under circumstances where the debtor explicitly refused to guarantee the debt, denied borrowing the money, and the annotations merely identify a payee for accounting purposes without constituting an unqualified admission of a subsisting obligation.

The Rule of The Retail Property Trust is that Revenue and Taxation Code section 170(a)(1) requires physical damage to property (whether direct or indirect) to qualify for reassessment relief, under circumstances where a property owner seeks disaster relief based on diminished property value from access restrictions alone without any physical harm to property.

The Rule of In re Sebastian C. is that placement in a family home with supervision and programming provided by a community-based agency can meet the requirements of a less restrictive program, under circumstances where the community-based nonresidential service program provides the programming and services rather than just the family home itself.

The Rule of Waterford Property Company v. County of Orange is that a declaratory relief action challenging governmental tax assessments arises from protected activity under the anti-SLAPP statute when the claim relies upon the government entity's public statements, advocacy, petitioning activities, and official communications regarding the tax assessments, under circumstances where the plaintiff frames the dispute as involving broader public policy issues and relies on the government's protected speech to establish both the existence of an actual controversy and the need for declaratory relief.

The Rule of Gonzalez v. Community Mortuary is that the affirmative defense of impracticability of performance is an equitable defense that must be decided by a judge, not a jury, under circumstances where a party seeks excuse from contract performance due to events making performance impracticable through no fault of their own.

The Rule of People v. Bradley is that the One Strike law permits only a single sentence per count based on qualifying circumstances, and the Habitual Sexual Offender law and One Strike law are alternative sentencing schemes requiring the trial court to choose only one, under circumstances where a defendant is convicted of qualifying sex offenses with multiple proven One Strike circumstances and prior convictions.

The Rule of Chi v. Department of Motor Vehicles is that a DMV hearing officer's combination of investigative and adjudicatory functions does not violate due process when the officer acts as a neutral fact-finder rather than as an advocate for the department, under circumstances where the officer introduces relevant evidence, asks clarifying questions, and rules on objections pursuant to a policy requiring neutrality.

The Rule of People v. Deen is that a trial court must conduct an objective evaluation of whether a prospective juror's circumstances would prevent or substantially interfere with their ability to act with entire impartiality, even when the juror states they can be fair, under circumstances where a panelist has personal relationships with victims or witnesses, has received detailed case information from prospective witnesses, and expresses concerns about their ability to be impartial.

The Rule of People v. Player is that a jury's not-true finding on a personal firearm use enhancement does not preclude a resentencing court from finding the defendant was the actual killer in a Penal Code section 1172.6 proceeding, under circumstances where the jury convicted the defendant of murder despite the not-true weapon enhancement finding.

The Rule of People v. Newt is that "receiving" a large-capacity magazine under Penal Code section 32310(a) requires evidence beyond mere possession, specifically evidence as to the provenance of the magazine (such as that defendant bought or received it after January 1, 2000, from someone who manufactured, imported, kept for sale, offered for sale, gave, or lent it), under circumstances where the prosecution seeks a felony conviction for "receiving" rather than a misdemeanor conviction for "possessing" under subdivision (c).

The Rule of In re J.H. is that victims have the constitutional and statutory right to present victim impact statements at juvenile court six-month review hearings under section 875, and courts may consider such statements when limited to components relevant to the minor's rehabilitation and empathy development, under circumstances where a juvenile's baseline confinement term is being reviewed for potential reduction.

The Rule of Armstrong v. Superior Court is that Penal Code section 1000.7 grants probation departments, not trial courts, the authority to determine whether defendants meet statutory criteria for young adult deferred entry of judgment programs, under circumstances where the Legislature has explicitly assigned this determination to the probation department through clear statutory language.

The Rule of Bair v. California Department of Transportation is that res judicata bars relitigation of a CEQA environmental analysis's substantive adequacy when the trial court has discharged a writ of mandate directing preparation of that analysis, under circumstances where petitioners challenged the agency's compliance with the writ in multiple simultaneous proceedings but failed to appeal the writ discharge order.

The Rule of Steven N. v. Priscilla C. is that a voluntary declaration of parentage (VDOP) is void as a matter of law when, at the time of signing, a third party is already a presumed parent under Family Code section 7611, subdivision (b), even if that presumed parent status arises from an invalid marriage solemnized in apparent compliance with law.

The Rule of In re E.J. is that Penal Code section 29820, which prohibits minors adjudged wards of the juvenile court for specified offenses from possessing firearms until age 30, is facially constitutional under the Second and Fourteenth Amendments, under circumstances where the prohibition is based on a prior juvenile adjudication for qualifying criminal conduct.

The Rule of Guinnane Construction Co. v. Chess is that the tort of another doctrine does not permit recovery of attorney fees incurred in litigating against the tortfeasor to recover fees awarded as damages, under circumstances where the plaintiff seeks to recover fees spent pursuing the tort action itself rather than fees incurred in third-party litigation necessitated by the tort.

The Rule of Independent Office of Law Enforcement Review and Outreach v. Sonoma County Sheriff's Office is that Government Code section 25303.7 grants mandatory subpoena power to all sheriff oversight entities established by counties, under circumstances where the county has elected to create such an oversight entity within the meaning of the statute.

The Rule of Cleare v. Superior Court is that a school district cannot invoke the impossibility doctrine to excuse non-compliance with statutory teacher credentialing requirements until it has exhausted all available statutory remedies including seeking waivers from the Commission on Teaching Credentialing or State Board of Education, under circumstances where the district uses long-term substitutes beyond statutory limits instead of permanent credentialed teachers.

The Rule of Aerni is that section 1940.1 does not require individualized proof that each class member used the hotel as their primary residence; rather, whether a hotel is "residential" is a hotel-wide inquiry based on the character and intended/actual use of the hotel as a whole, under circumstances where plaintiffs seek class certification for claims alleging the "28-day shuffle" practice at residential hotels.

The Rule of Pechkis v. Trustees of the California State University is that an anti-SLAPP motion to strike entire causes of action fails when the defendant does not identify with specificity how each claim underlying the causes of action arises from protected activity, under circumstances where the causes of action contain both protected and unprotected conduct.

The Rule of Chi v. Department of Motor Vehicles is that a DMV hearing officer does not violate due process by introducing evidence and ruling on objections when acting as a neutral fact-finder rather than as an advocate, under circumstances where the DMV has expressly instructed hearing officers to act impartially and not advocate for the department.

The Rule of People v. Tzul is that a defendant's handwritten note found at a crime scene stating he found victims "having sex" and that this "fills me with rage" is admissible as circumstantial evidence of the defendant's state of mind for provocation defense, under circumstances where the statement about what defendant observed is not hearsay when offered to show defendant's belief rather than truth of the observation, and the statement about defendant's emotional reaction is admissible hearsay under Evidence Code section 1250's state-of-mind exception.

The Rule of People v. Sanchez is that when a court corrects a clerical error in calculating prison time on an abstract of judgment, it lacks jurisdiction to modify other aspects of a final sentence absent specific statutory authorization, under circumstances where the original sentencing court properly sentenced defendant to separate felony prison terms and misdemeanor county jail terms but the abstract incorrectly included misdemeanor time in the total state prison calculation.

The Rule of People v. Taft is that when calculating presentence custody credit for noncontinuous periods of custody, the total days of actual confinement must be aggregated first, and then matching conduct credit calculated on that total, under circumstances where a defendant served time before probation was granted and additional time after probation was violated.

The Rule of NNN Capital Fund I, LLC v. Mikles is that lack of standing is a jurisdictional defect that can be raised for the first time on appeal and requires vacation of an arbitration award and remand for factual determination of standing, under circumstances where purported liquidating trustees may not have been properly elected under the company's operating agreement.

The Rule of Sheerer v. Panas is that a trial court must include all bonus income and restricted stock units (RSUs) in calculating child support under the uniform statewide guideline formula, under circumstances where a parent receives such variable compensation and the court has not made proper findings to deviate from the presumptively correct guideline amount.

The Rule of Clapkin v. Levin is that a cross-complaint does not arise from protected litigation activity under Code of Civil Procedure section 425.16 when the claims are based on the defendant's unprotected business conduct that supplies the elements of liability, even where the cross-complaint references prior litigation for context and evidence, under circumstances where the same dispute would exist absent the litigation activity.

The Rule of Torres v. Munoz is that a court abuses its discretion by citing and relying on fictitious case authorities in its order, but a party forfeits the right to challenge such error when the party's own counsel drafted and submitted the order containing the fabricated citations without objecting or alerting the court to the fictitious nature of the authorities, under circumstances where the party had opportunity to verify citations and speak up before the court signed the order.

The Rule of Los Angeles County Professional Peace Officers Association v. County of Los Angeles is that a union's waiver of its right to meet and confer over an employer's outsourcing decision must be "clear and unmistakable," and vague management rights language stating the employer has "no obligation to negotiate the decision of any reorganization" does not satisfy this standard, under circumstances where the MOU discusses outsourcing procedures but does not expressly waive bargaining rights regarding the outsourcing decision itself.

The Rule of People v. Valencia is that warrantless entry into a home during hot pursuit of a fleeing felon is justified by exigent circumstances when officers are pursuing a suspect who committed a dangerous felony and poses ongoing risks to public safety, and once lawfully inside, police need not obtain a warrant to continue addressing an evolving standoff situation, under circumstances involving a high-speed chase ending at the suspect's residence followed by barricading and armed resistance.

The Rule of John Doe v. Regents of the University of California is that students accused of sexual misconduct in university disciplinary proceedings have no absolute right to cross-examine accusers at a hearing when they have already had a meaningful opportunity to cross-examine those accusers under oath in related criminal proceedings, under circumstances where the university follows its own procedures and the decision-maker has access to sworn testimony transcripts from the criminal case.

The Rule of People v. Nelson is that a trial court may properly deny mental health diversion when it finds as trier of fact that the defendant's mental health disorders were not a significant factor in the commission of the charged offenses, under circumstances where the court expressly rejects expert testimony linking mental illness to criminal conduct and finds the defendant poses a public safety risk based on extensive criminal history.

The Rule of Las Posas Valley Water Rights Coalition v. Ventura County Waterworks District No. 1 is that in a comprehensive groundwater adjudication, trial courts may allocate water rights directly to overlying landowners rather than to mutual water companies when the companies act as agents/trustees exercising rights on behalf of shareholders and the landowners retain their underlying overlying water rights, under circumstances where substantial evidence shows the landowners never severed their water rights through written transfer and the companies do not assert exclusive rights against their shareholders.

The Rule of Physicians for Social Responsibility – Los Angeles v. Department of Toxic Substances Control is that attorney fees cannot be awarded under the catalyst theory where a party has received a final adverse judgment on the merits before the defendant voluntarily provides the relief originally sought, under circumstances where the voluntary action occurs after the lawsuit has been fully litigated to a final judgment against the fee-seeking party.

The Rule of Harrington v. Housing Authority of Riverside County is that under Code of Civil Procedure section 1094.5, a trial court conducting independent judgment review must determine whether the agency's factual findings are supported by the evidence, not independently find facts to support the agency's ultimate decision, under circumstances where fundamental vested rights like Section 8 housing assistance are at stake.

The Rule of Ehrenkranz v. San Francisco Zen Center is that the ministerial exception does not bar wage-and-hour claims by ministers against religious organizations absent evidence that such claims raise an ecclesiastical concern, under circumstances where the claims seek only lost or unpaid wages for work performed as part of the religious organization's commercial activities and adjudication requires no inquiry into ecclesiastical matters.

The Rule of Benjamin Woodhouse v. The State Bar of California et al. is that trial courts have inherent authority to dismiss complaints that assert fantastic, delusional, or fanciful scenarios that have no arguable basis in law or fact, and may declare such plaintiffs vexatious litigants, under circumstances where the complaint presents allegations that no reasonable person would classify as within the realm of possibility.

The Rule of Bartholomew v. Parking Concepts is that collecting and maintaining individuals' ALPR information without implementing and making public the statutorily required policy harms these individuals by violating their right to know, under the California Automated License Plate Recognition Law (Civil Code sections 1798.90.5-1798.90.551).

The Rule of People v. Morgan is that assault is not a lesser included offense of resisting an executive officer by use of force or violence under Penal Code section 69(a), under circumstances where the defendant's forceful resistance does not require a "present ability" to commit violent injury as required for assault.

The Rule of People v. Gonzalez is that Assembly Bill No.

The Rule of J.S. v. D.A. is that indigent inmates in bona fide civil actions that threaten their interests have a right to meaningful access to the courts to be heard in their defense, and trial courts must address and rule on such requests before proceeding without the inmate, under circumstances where an incarcerated defendant requests court assistance to participate in proceedings and the court has notice of the incarceration.

The Rule of In re Christian V. is that a juvenile case becomes final for Estrada retroactivity purposes when the time to appeal the dispositional order expires or direct review is exhausted, regardless of whether the minor remains on probation or whether subsequent post-judgment orders are entered, under circumstances where the minor did not timely appeal the original dispositional order.

The Rule of Jogani v. Jogani is that an expert's undisclosed opinion regarding lost profits cannot be admitted at trial without prior disclosure, under circumstances where the opinion concerns a specific damages calculation ($1.98 billion in alleged lost investment profits) that was never disclosed in discovery.

The Rule of Jazmin Ayala-Ventura v. The Superior Court of Fresno County is that an employment arbitration agreement with potentially broad scope and indefinite duration is not substantively unconscionable when the employer's limited business operations restrict the realistic range of non-employment claims that could arise, under circumstances where the agreement provides mutual arbitration obligations, neutral arbitration procedures, and accessible dispute resolution terms.

The Rule of Flareau is that a trial court abuses its residual discretion when denying mental health diversion based on finding that other factors were "more" motivating than the defendant's mental disorder, under circumstances where the defendant is eligible for diversion and the mental disorder was at least a contributing factor to the offense.

The Rule of The People v. T.B. is that "no less onerous alternatives" in Penal Code section 2679(b) refers to medical alternatives to the proposed organic therapy, not to alternative procedural methods of obtaining consent, under circumstances where an inmate patient lacks capacity to consent to electroconvulsive therapy and the court must authorize nonconsensual ECT.

The Rule of *People v. Alston* is that under Code of Civil Procedure section 231.7, a trial court must expressly explain its reasons on the record when ruling on an objection to a peremptory challenge, including making findings on whether presumptively invalid reasons were rebutted by clear and convincing evidence, under circumstances where the prosecutor's stated reasons for the challenge include distrust of law enforcement by a prospective juror who is a member of a cognizable group.

The Rule of People v. Dixon is that grand jury proceeding transcripts and police reports containing witness statements are inadmissible at Penal Code section 1172.6 evidentiary hearings, under circumstances where the defendant had no opportunity to cross-examine witnesses and the documents constitute multiple levels of hearsay without applicable exceptions.

The Rule of People v. Flores is that an electronics search condition for probation is constitutional and reasonable when the defendant used electronic devices as integral tools in the commission of the underlying offense, under circumstances where the defendant used internet-based platforms and VOIP technology to facilitate drug sales and conceal their identity.

The Rule of The People v. Zapata is that when a suspect invokes and does not waive the right to counsel, and a known law enforcement officer continues to "stimulate" a Perkins operation in a manner that amounts to a custodial interrogation, the suspect's resulting incriminating statements are inadmissible, under circumstances where the known officer's actions were reasonably likely to elicit an incriminating response and created a police-dominated atmosphere of compulsion.

The Rule of In re Marriage of Danielle and Lewis Allen is that parents are precluded from contractually waiving or forgiving past due child support arrearages even after the child has reached the age of majority and there is no longer a current support order in place, under circumstances where the obligor seeks to enforce an accord and satisfaction agreement for less than the full arrearage amount.

The Rule of Bartholomew v. Parking Concepts, Inc. is that collecting and using license plate information through an automated system without implementing and making publicly available the statutorily required usage and privacy policy constitutes "harm" under the ALPR Law sufficient to state a cause of action, under circumstances where an entity operates cameras and computer algorithms to automatically read and convert license plate images into computer-readable data.

The Rule of Fuentes v. Empire Nissan, Inc. is that a contract's format and illegibility generally do not support substantive unconscionability, but courts must closely scrutinize difficult-to-read contracts for unfair or one-sided terms when high procedural unconscionability exists, under circumstances where an employment arbitration agreement is presented in nearly illegible tiny print with minimal time for review.

The Rule of Navellier v. Putnam is that parties to an appeal must promptly notify the appellate court of any bankruptcy filing that "could cause or impose a stay" of proceedings, even if they believe the stay does not apply, under Local Rule 21's mandatory disclosure requirements.

The Rule of People v. Heaps is that ex parte communications with a deliberating jury concerning a juror's ability to deliberate require reversal unless the prosecution proves harmless error beyond a reasonable doubt, under circumstances where the trial court fails to notify counsel of the jury's note raising competency concerns and the record does not establish how the jury resolved those concerns.

The Rule of Navellier v. Putnam is that appellate counsel must promptly notify the court of any party's bankruptcy that could potentially cause a stay under Local Rule 21, regardless of counsel's belief about whether the stay actually applies, under circumstances where the attorney knows about the bankruptcy filing.

The Rule of Brown v. Department of Motor Vehicles is that the Department of Motor Vehicles is not required to disclose the identity of a third-party reporter who initiates a driver reexamination proceeding, under circumstances where the reporter's form merely initiates the process but is not relied upon for the ultimate license suspension decision, the driver receives notice and hearing opportunities, and disclosure of the reporter's identity would compromise road safety by deterring future reports.

The Rule of People v. Aguilar is that a prosecutor's peremptory challenge based on alleged "juror confusion" is presumptively invalid under Code of Civil Procedure section 231.7, subdivision (g)(1)(C), and requires the trial court to confirm that the asserted confused behavior actually occurred based on the court's own observations, under circumstances where the prospective juror is perceived as a member of a protected group and gives clear, consistent answers regarding the legal concept in question.

The Rule of People v. Gomez is that use of animal imagery in criminal proceedings does not violate the Racial Justice Act when the animal reference is benign, endearing, and used solely to explain legal concepts rather than to dehumanize or exhibit racial bias, under circumstances where an objective observer would understand the comparison relates to the state of evidence rather than character traits.

The Rule of Viani v. Fair Oaks Estates, Inc. is that a costs judgment entered after a nonappealable voluntary dismissal without prejudice is not appealable as a final judgment when the appellant seeks to challenge underlying orders rather than the costs determination itself, under circumstances where allowing the appeal would constitute impermissible back-door review of nonappealable orders.

The Rule of Department of Water Resources v. The Metropolitan Water District of Southern California is that a state agency's definition of a proposed program must be sufficiently definite to ascertain whether it qualifies as a statutory "modification" of an existing authorized project rather than a new unit requiring separate legislative approval, under circumstances where the agency seeks to validate revenue bonds based on broad definitional language that fails to establish clear boundaries or purposes for the proposed facilities.

The Rule of In re Lynex is that to obtain appointed counsel under the California Racial Justice Act, an indigent habeas petitioner need only plead a "plausible allegation" of a violation of Penal Code section 745(a), which is an "extremely low" and "minimal pleading requirement" that does not require a prima facie showing of entitlement to relief, under circumstances where the petitioner seeks counsel to prosecute racial bias claims in criminal proceedings.

The Rule of People v. Dixon is that grand jury proceeding transcripts are not admissible under Penal Code section 1172.6(d)(3)'s hearsay exception for evidence previously admitted at a prior hearing or trial, under circumstances where the Legislature used specific statutory language referring to "hearings" and "trials" while grand jury proceedings are designated as "proceedings" or "sessions" in the statutory scheme and lack adversarial safeguards.

The Rule of Zenith Insurance Company v. Workers' Compensation Appeals Board is that equitable tolling of the 60-day deadline under former Labor Code section 5909 cannot justify the Workers' Compensation Appeals Board's 20-month delay in issuing a decision on reconsideration after granting a petition for "further study," under circumstances where the Board failed to demonstrate reasonable and good faith conduct in attempting to comply with statutory procedures.

The Rule of Microsoft Corporation v. Superior Court of Los Angeles County is that a trial court may issue a nondisclosure order prohibiting an electronic service provider from notifying its enterprise customer of a search warrant's existence, under circumstances where the court has reviewed a sealed affidavit and found that disclosure could cause adverse results enumerated in CalECPA, even when the provider proposes to notify only a "trusted contact" at the customer organization who is not the target of the investigation.

The Rule of Spring Oaks Capital SPV, LLC v. Fowler is that a party who fails to properly disclose witness names and addresses in response to a Code of Civil Procedure section 96 request cannot call that undisclosed witness at trial, under circumstances where the responding party only provided the witness's role without specific name identification and the requesting party properly objected.

The Rule of People v. J.C. is that the firearm prohibition under Penal Code section 29820, subdivision (b), does not apply to minors adjudicated as juvenile court wards for brandishing an imitation firearm under Penal Code section 417.4, under circumstances where section 417.4 is not among the statutorily enumerated offenses in section 29805 that trigger the firearm ban.

The Rule of Parsonage v. Wal-Mart Associates, Inc. is that ICRAA authorizes consumers to recover the statutory sum of $10,000 as a remedy for a violation of their statutory rights, without any further showing of concrete injury or adverse employment decision, under circumstances where an employer fails to comply with any requirement of ICRAA's disclosure and consent provisions.

The Rule of Hatlevig v. General Motors LLC is that a motion for attorney fees must be served within 180 days of when a case is voluntarily dismissed pursuant to court order, even when no formal dismissal order is filed until a later date, under circumstances where the case was deemed dismissed by operation of court rules after settlement.

The Rule of Disney Platform Distribution v. City of Santa Barbara is that a municipal ordinance imposing a tax on video services applies to internet video streaming services when the ordinance uses "channel" in its ordinary meaning as a "programming source" rather than in the technical sense of a "transmission path," under circumstances where the ordinance was approved by voters to modernize and technologically neutralize video service taxation.

The Rule of Bishop v. San Diego County Employees Retirement Association is that a public employee suffers a "conviction" within the meaning of Government Code section 7522.74 when the employee pleads guilty to or is found guilty of a job-related felony, regardless of whether the court later reduces the offense to a misdemeanor under Penal Code section 17(b), under circumstances where the employee pleaded guilty to a felony charge before any reduction occurred.

The Rule of Semaan v. Mosier is that court-appointed receivers are protected by quasi-judicial immunity for their discretionary acts and decisions made in their capacity as receiver, under circumstances where the receiver must exercise judgment or discretion in performing their judicial functions.

The Rule of Monroe is that a state employee who service retires while under investigation for misconduct is ineligible for disability retirement benefits because the service retirement constitutes a complete severance of the employer-employee relationship, eliminating the necessary prerequisite for disability retirement—the right to return to service, under circumstances where the employee's departure was not related to a disabling medical condition and occurred during misconduct proceedings.

The Rule of Dion v. Weber is that under the Victims of Corporate Fraud Compensation Fund statutory scheme, trial courts are precluded from relitigating the merits of underlying fraud judgments when evaluating payment claims from the fund, under circumstances where the Secretary of State denies payment based on challenges to the validity of the original fraud judgment.

The Rule of People v. Perez is that impoundment of a legally parked vehicle solely to prevent future unlawful driving by an unlicensed driver does not satisfy the Fourth Amendment's community caretaking function, under circumstances where the vehicle poses no present danger to public safety or traffic flow.

The Rule of 360 So Reeves, LLC v. Jeff Dutton is that a lessor's noncompliance with Civil Code section 1962 is an affirmative defense for which the lessee bears the burden of proof, under circumstances where a successor landlord allegedly failed to provide proper notice of change of ownership and service of process information to a residential tenant.

The Rule of Melissa I. Aerni et al. v. RR San Dimas, L.P., et al. is that Civil Code section 1940.1 does not require individualized proof that each plaintiff used a residential hotel as their own primary residence, under circumstances where plaintiffs seek class certification for violations of the statute's prohibition against the "28-day shuffle."

The Rule of Albarghouti is that the California False Claims Act creates a 60-day default sealing period, after which the seal lifts automatically absent the government's request for an extension, under circumstances where a qui tam plaintiff files the complaint in camera, serves the Attorney General by certified mail, and the government neither requests a seal extension nor provides notice of its intervention decision within 60 days.

The Rule of People v. Espiritu is that when a trial court fails to make a meaningful inquiry into whether proffered reasons for exercising peremptory challenges fall into presumptively invalid categories under Code of Civil Procedure section 231.7, the defendant's initial objection under the statute preserves appellate review of that procedural failure, under circumstances where defense counsel objected to a peremptory challenge but did not specifically identify the potential presumptive invalidity below.

The Rule of Department of Water Resources Cases is that Water Code section 250 and 11580 project authorization and funding requirements do not apply to precondemnation entry and testing activities under Code of Civil Procedure section 1245.010, under circumstances where a public entity with eminent domain authority seeks temporary access to conduct investigations to determine property suitability for future condemnation.

The Rule of Zand v. Sukumar is that an appellant cannot use the doctrine of voidness to collaterally attack a final appellate judgment by claiming trial court orders were void, when the challenged orders rest on errors that are merely in excess of jurisdiction rather than fundamental jurisdictional defects, under circumstances where the appellant has already appealed the underlying orders and lost.

The Rule of People v. Harzan is that a trial court prejudicially violates a defendant's constitutional right to present a defense when it conditions the exclusion of highly prejudicial prior misconduct evidence on the defendant's waiver of an entrapment defense, under circumstances where the prior misconduct evidence is not relevant to the objective entrapment standard under California law.

The Rule of People v. Landrine is that a trial court may not find satisfactory performance in mental health diversion unless the defendant substantially complies with the requirements imposed on diversion, under circumstances where the defendant commits dozens of new crimes while in the diversion program despite express warnings that any new crimes would result in termination.

The Rule of Detrick v. Shimada is that a non-English speaking witness's declaration is inadmissible without foundational evidence of a qualified interpreter and attestation that the translation accurately reflects the witness's words, under circumstances where the witness cannot read, write, or speak English and provides no evidence of interpreter qualifications or translation accuracy.

The Rule of Nishida v. Kamoda is that a civil fraud action alleging misrepresentations during family law property settlement negotiations may be transferred to family law court rather than dismissed for jurisdictional reasons, and the action remains timely under Family Code section 2122 if filed within one year of discovering the fraud, under circumstances where the plaintiff files in civil court but the case is properly transferred to family law court.

The Rule of People v. Wayne Hansen Hsiung is that a criminal defendant charged with specific intent crimes may present a mistake of law defense based on good faith reliance on legal advice about the necessity defense, even when the necessity defense itself is legally unavailable, under circumstances where the defendant obtained legal opinions from qualified professionals regarding the lawfulness of his conduct and relied on those opinions in good faith.

The Rule of *People v. Parker B.* is that when a juvenile court dismisses a petition under Welfare and Institutions Code section 782 after adjudication without qualification, the dismissal encompasses both the petition and all findings made on the offenses alleged therein, thereby satisfying section 786(d)'s requirement that "the finding on that offense was dismissed" for purposes of sealing records involving Penal Code section 707(b) offenses committed at age 14 or older, under circumstances where the juvenile has satisfactorily completed probation and the court has not expressly limited the scope of its dismissal.

The Rule of People v. Pineda is that at section 1172.6 resentencing evidentiary hearings, previously admitted hearsay testimony from preliminary hearings is admissible if it meets a current hearsay exception, including the declaration against interest exception when the statements subjected the declarant to risk of criminal liability.

The Rule of The People v. Robinson is that Penal Code section 1172.75, subdivision (f) must be construed conjunctively to exclude from resentencing only those individuals who have been convicted of a qualifying sexually violent offense AND sentenced to death or life without parole, under circumstances where Senate Bill No.