California Legal Brief

The Rule of Department of Human Resources v. California Correctional Peace Officers Association is that an arbitrator does not exceed their powers by issuing an award that offsets an SPB-approved disciplinary suspension when the award is based on violations of the Dills Act and MOU protections for union activity, under circumstances where the SPB reviewed the disciplinary action for cause under the Civil Service Act while the arbitrator separately reviewed whether the same discipline constituted unlawful retaliation for protected activities.

The Rule of Garcia-Rojas v. Franchise Tax Board is that a nonresident sole proprietor engaging in only one business activity cannot constitute a "unitary business" for purposes of California taxation under regulation 17951-4(c), under circumstances where the taxpayer operates a single-activity sole proprietorship receiving compensation from one entity, even when that entity's clients are located both within and outside California.

The Rule of The Chemical Toxin Working Group is that Proposition 65's 60-day pre-suit notice substantially complies with regulatory requirements when it provides the name and contact information of the noticing entity's outside counsel rather than a responsible individual within the noticing entity, under circumstances where the notice otherwise identifies the alleged violation with sufficient specificity to enable prosecuting agencies to assess the claim and allow violators to cure violations.

The Rule of Raptors Are the Solution v. CropLife America is that trade associations that intervene in litigation to protect their members' direct pecuniary interests in government registration decisions are "opposing parties" liable for private attorney general fees under Code of Civil Procedure section 1021.5, under circumstances where the intervenors actively participate in defending challenged government approvals that directly affect their members' economic interests.

The Rule of Garner v. California Victim Compensation Board is that a murder conviction that was valid under the law in effect at the time of trial is not "erroneous" within the meaning of Penal Code section 4900, under circumstances where the Legislature subsequently changed the definition of murder and the conviction was vacated under Penal Code section 1172.6 based on the new definition.

The Rule of People ex rel. Yolo-Solano Air Quality Management District v. Spencer Defty is that a cross-complaint challenging the validity of an internal agency policy does not arise from protected activity under the anti-SLAPP statute when the regulatory enforcement actions are merely evidence of the policy's application rather than the basis for liability, under circumstances where the cross-complaint seeks declaratory relief that the policy was adopted without proper rulemaking procedures.

The Rule of Citizens Against Marketplace Apartment/Condo Development v. City of San Ramon is that a city does not abuse its discretion in approving an infill housing development despite general plan language encouraging preparation of a "master plan," under circumstances where the general plan uses discretionary language ("encourage") rather than mandatory requirements and the project achieves the substantive objectives of circulation, access, and visibility improvements while introducing mixed-use residential development.

The Rule of Shear Development Co. v. California Coastal Commission is that courts must exercise independent judgment in determining an agency's appellate jurisdiction when that jurisdiction depends primarily on interpretation of enacted law rather than factual matters, and where two agencies offer conflicting interpretations of a law both administer, no deference is due to either when the Yamaha factors do not clearly favor one interpretation, under circumstances where jurisdictional disputes turn on legal interpretation of local coastal programs and multiple agencies share administrative responsibility.

The Rule of Shear Development Co. v. California Coastal Commission is that courts must exercise independent judgment when reviewing an agency's jurisdictional determinations based on legal interpretation of enacted law, and when two agencies offer conflicting interpretations of law they both administer, neither receives deference if Yamaha factors do not clearly favor one over the other, under circumstances where the jurisdictional question depends primarily on statutory or LCP interpretation rather than factual disputes.

The Rule of Myers v. Department of Motor Vehicles is that body-worn camera video evidence showing an officer failed to continuously observe a DUI suspect for 15 minutes before administering a chemical breath test successfully rebuts the Evidence Code section 664 presumption of compliance with Title 17 regulations, under circumstances where the video objectively demonstrates the officer left the suspect alone in a patrol car with doors closed during the observation period.

The Rule of The Retail Property Trust is that Revenue and Taxation Code section 170(a)(1) requires physical damage to property (whether direct or indirect) to qualify for reassessment relief, under circumstances where a property owner seeks disaster relief based on diminished property value from access restrictions alone without any physical harm to property.

The Rule of Waterford Property Company v. County of Orange is that a declaratory relief action challenging governmental tax assessments arises from protected activity under the anti-SLAPP statute when the claim relies upon the government entity's public statements, advocacy, petitioning activities, and official communications regarding the tax assessments, under circumstances where the plaintiff frames the dispute as involving broader public policy issues and relies on the government's protected speech to establish both the existence of an actual controversy and the need for declaratory relief.

The Rule of Chi v. Department of Motor Vehicles is that a DMV hearing officer's combination of investigative and adjudicatory functions does not violate due process when the officer acts as a neutral fact-finder rather than as an advocate for the department, under circumstances where the officer introduces relevant evidence, asks clarifying questions, and rules on objections pursuant to a policy requiring neutrality.

The Rule of Armstrong v. Superior Court is that Penal Code section 1000.7 grants probation departments, not trial courts, the authority to determine whether defendants meet statutory criteria for young adult deferred entry of judgment programs, under circumstances where the Legislature has explicitly assigned this determination to the probation department through clear statutory language.

The Rule of Bair v. California Department of Transportation is that res judicata bars relitigation of a CEQA environmental analysis's substantive adequacy when the trial court has discharged a writ of mandate directing preparation of that analysis, under circumstances where petitioners challenged the agency's compliance with the writ in multiple simultaneous proceedings but failed to appeal the writ discharge order.

The Rule of Independent Office of Law Enforcement Review and Outreach v. Sonoma County Sheriff's Office is that Government Code section 25303.7 grants mandatory subpoena power to all sheriff oversight entities established by counties, under circumstances where the county has elected to create such an oversight entity within the meaning of the statute.

The Rule of Cleare v. Superior Court is that a school district cannot invoke the impossibility doctrine to excuse non-compliance with statutory teacher credentialing requirements until it has exhausted all available statutory remedies including seeking waivers from the Commission on Teaching Credentialing or State Board of Education, under circumstances where the district uses long-term substitutes beyond statutory limits instead of permanent credentialed teachers.

The Rule of West Contra Costa Unified School District is that a school district cannot claim impossibility as a defense to statutory teacher certification requirements until it has exhausted all statutory alternatives, including seeking waivers from the Commission on Teaching Credentialing or the State Board of Education, under circumstances where the district uses rolling substitutes instead of qualified permanent teachers in violation of statutory mandates.

The Rule of Chi v. Department of Motor Vehicles is that a DMV hearing officer does not violate due process by introducing evidence and ruling on objections when acting as a neutral fact-finder rather than as an advocate, under circumstances where the DMV has expressly instructed hearing officers to act impartially and not advocate for the department.

The Rule of City of Fresno is that "great bodily injury" as used in Penal Code section 832.7(b)(1)(A)(ii) for California Public Records Act disclosure of law enforcement records means "a significant or substantial physical injury" as defined in Penal Code section 12022.7(f)(1), under circumstances where records relate to incidents involving use of force by police officers against persons.

The Rule of Los Angeles County Professional Peace Officers Association v. County of Los Angeles is that a union's waiver of its right to meet and confer over an employer's outsourcing decision must be "clear and unmistakable," and vague management rights language stating the employer has "no obligation to negotiate the decision of any reorganization" does not satisfy this standard, under circumstances where the MOU discusses outsourcing procedures but does not expressly waive bargaining rights regarding the outsourcing decision itself.

The Rule of John Doe v. Regents of the University of California is that students accused of sexual misconduct in university disciplinary proceedings have no absolute right to cross-examine accusers at a hearing when they have already had a meaningful opportunity to cross-examine those accusers under oath in related criminal proceedings, under circumstances where the university follows its own procedures and the decision-maker has access to sworn testimony transcripts from the criminal case.

The Rule of Las Posas Valley Water Rights Coalition v. Ventura County Waterworks District No. 1 is that in a comprehensive groundwater adjudication, trial courts may allocate water rights directly to overlying landowners rather than to mutual water companies when the companies act as agents/trustees exercising rights on behalf of shareholders and the landowners retain their underlying overlying water rights, under circumstances where substantial evidence shows the landowners never severed their water rights through written transfer and the companies do not assert exclusive rights against their shareholders.

The Rule of Physicians for Social Responsibility – Los Angeles v. Department of Toxic Substances Control is that attorney fees cannot be awarded under the catalyst theory where a party has received a final adverse judgment on the merits before the defendant voluntarily provides the relief originally sought, under circumstances where the voluntary action occurs after the lawsuit has been fully litigated to a final judgment against the fee-seeking party.

The Rule of Harrington v. Housing Authority of Riverside County is that under Code of Civil Procedure section 1094.5, a trial court conducting independent judgment review must determine whether the agency's factual findings are supported by the evidence, not independently find facts to support the agency's ultimate decision, under circumstances where fundamental vested rights like Section 8 housing assistance are at stake.

The Rule of Fix the City, Inc. v. City of Los Angeles is that a charter city may enact an ordinance establishing a local housing and/or homelessness emergency that confers mayoral powers to address conditions within the city's territory, under circumstances where the ordinance defines different types of emergencies and powers than those provided in the California Emergency Services Act and does not conflict with CESA's coordination and mutual aid framework.

The Rule of County of Sacramento v. NKS Real Estate Holdings, Inc. is that a county may pursue a nuisance per se action against property owners who construct and lease accessory dwelling units without required building permits, under circumstances where the county has adopted ordinances expressly declaring permit violations to be public nuisances.

The Rule of Committee for Tiburon LLC v. Town of Tiburon is that a program EIR for a local agency's general plan need not include site-specific environmental analysis of sites identified in the housing element where no housing project has been proposed for the site, under circumstances where the absence of project-specific details precludes informed review of environmental impacts and mitigation measures.

The Rule of Brown v. Department of Motor Vehicles is that the Department of Motor Vehicles is not required to disclose the identity of a third-party reporter who initiates a driver reexamination proceeding, under circumstances where the reporter's form merely initiates the process but is not relied upon for the ultimate license suspension decision, the driver receives notice and hearing opportunities, and disclosure of the reporter's identity would compromise road safety by deterring future reports.

The Rule of Department of Water Resources v. The Metropolitan Water District of Southern California is that a state agency's definition of a proposed program must be sufficiently definite to ascertain whether it qualifies as a statutory "modification" of an existing authorized project rather than a new unit requiring separate legislative approval, under circumstances where the agency seeks to validate revenue bonds based on broad definitional language that fails to establish clear boundaries or purposes for the proposed facilities.

The Rule of Zenith Insurance Company v. Workers' Compensation Appeals Board is that equitable tolling of the 60-day deadline under former Labor Code section 5909 cannot justify the Workers' Compensation Appeals Board's 20-month delay in issuing a decision on reconsideration after granting a petition for "further study," under circumstances where the Board failed to demonstrate reasonable and good faith conduct in attempting to comply with statutory procedures.

The Rule of Disney Platform Distribution v. City of Santa Barbara is that a municipal ordinance imposing a tax on video services applies to internet video streaming services when the ordinance uses "channel" in its ordinary meaning as a "programming source" rather than in the technical sense of a "transmission path," under circumstances where the ordinance was approved by voters to modernize and technologically neutralize video service taxation.

The Rule of Bishop v. San Diego County Employees Retirement Association is that a public employee suffers a "conviction" within the meaning of Government Code section 7522.74 when the employee pleads guilty to or is found guilty of a job-related felony, regardless of whether the court later reduces the offense to a misdemeanor under Penal Code section 17(b), under circumstances where the employee pleaded guilty to a felony charge before any reduction occurred.

The Rule of Trustees of the California State University is that public employers have a duty to bargain over reasonably foreseeable effects of student vaccination policy changes on immunocompromised faculty health and safety, but implementation must actually begin before an unfair practice violation occurs, under the Higher Education Employer-Employee Relations Act (HEERA).

The Rule of Center for Biological Diversity, Inc. v. Public Utilities Commission is that a public utilities commission's quasi-legislative decision developing a successor net energy metering tariff pursuant to statutory directive receives narrow judicial review and will be upheld if it lies within the lawmaking authority delegated by the Legislature and is reasonably necessary to implement the statutory purpose, under circumstances where the Legislature has explicitly directed the commission to develop a tariff meeting specified objectives while providing discretion to revise the tariff as appropriate.

The Rule of Monroe is that a state employee who service retires while under investigation for misconduct is ineligible for disability retirement benefits because the service retirement constitutes a complete severance of the employer-employee relationship, eliminating the necessary prerequisite for disability retirement—the right to return to service, under circumstances where the employee's departure was not related to a disabling medical condition and occurred during misconduct proceedings.

The Rule of Dion v. Weber is that under the Victims of Corporate Fraud Compensation Fund statutory scheme, trial courts are precluded from relitigating the merits of underlying fraud judgments when evaluating payment claims from the fund, under circumstances where the Secretary of State denies payment based on challenges to the validity of the original fraud judgment.

The Rule of Department of Water Resources Cases is that a public entity with eminent domain authority may conduct precondemnation entry and testing activities under Code of Civil Procedure section 1245.010 et seq.

The Rule of Albarghouti is that the California False Claims Act creates a 60-day default sealing period, after which the seal lifts automatically absent the government's request for an extension, under circumstances where a qui tam plaintiff files the complaint in camera, serves the Attorney General by certified mail, and the government neither requests a seal extension nor provides notice of its intervention decision within 60 days.

The Rule of Department of Water Resources Cases is that Water Code section 250 and 11580 project authorization and funding requirements do not apply to precondemnation entry and testing activities under Code of Civil Procedure section 1245.010, under circumstances where a public entity with eminent domain authority seeks temporary access to conduct investigations to determine property suitability for future condemnation.

The Rule of Sam Cleare et al. v. Superior Court of Contra Costa County is that a school district cannot claim impossibility as a defense to teacher credentialing requirements without first exhaustively pursuing all statutory alternatives, including requesting waivers from the Commission on Teacher Credentialing and State Board of Education, under circumstances where the district acknowledges non-compliance with teacher vacancy and substitute teacher limitations.

The Rule of Apartment Association of Los Angeles County, Inc. v. City of Los Angeles is that a municipal ordinance creating a monetary threshold that must be satisfied before a cause of action for unlawful detainer accrues is a permissible substantive regulation of the grounds for eviction rather than an impermissible procedural limitation on the unlawful detainer statutes, under circumstances where the ordinance does not extend the unlawful detainer timeline, does not prohibit landlords from proceeding under the state statutory timeline, and does not require landlords to take affirmative action before commencing unlawful detainer proceedings.