California Legal Brief

The Rule of City of Fresno is that "great bodily injury" as used in Penal Code section 832.7(b)(1)(A)(ii) for California Public Records Act disclosure of law enforcement records means "a significant or substantial physical injury" as defined in Penal Code section 12022.7(f)(1), under circumstances where records relate to incidents involving use of force by police officers against persons.

Appeal from order granting peremptory writ of mandate in Superior Court, Fresno County.

Petitioner Appellant was City of Fresno — the municipal law enforcement agency that withheld police K-9 use-of-force records claiming they did not involve great bodily injury as narrowly defined.

Real Party in Interest Respondent was American Civil Liberties Union of Southern California — the civil rights organization seeking disclosure of police K-9 records under the California Public Records Act.

The suit sounded in public records disclosure under the California Public Records Act. No cross-claims.

The key substantive facts leading to the suit were ACLU submitted a CPRA request on March 27, 2023 seeking police K-9 use-of-force records from January 1, 2019 forward. City disclosed over 900 pages but withheld/redacted records involving K-9 incidents that resulted in punctures, lacerations and contusions, claiming these did not constitute "great bodily injury" under section 832.7(b)(1)(A)(ii). City argued "great bodily injury" should be narrowly construed to mean "serious bodily injury" requiring life-threatening or permanently disabling injuries.

The procedural result leading to the Appeal: The trial court granted ACLU's motion for judgment on the petition and issued a peremptory writ of mandate, ruling that "great bodily injury" has a well-accepted legal meaning as "a significant or substantial physical injury" under section 12022.7(f)(1) and that the Legislature's substitution of "great bodily injury" for "serious bodily injury" in the bill's legislative history showed intent to expand public access.

The key question(s) on Appeal: Whether "great bodily injury" as used in Penal Code section 832.7(b)(1)(A)(ii) should be construed to mean "a significant or substantial physical injury" per section 12022.7(f)(1) or should be construed more narrowly to mean "serious bodily injury" as defined in Government Code section 12525.2(d)(4).

The Appellate Court held that the plain language controls and "great bodily injury" in section 832.7 means the same as in section 12022.7(f)(1) because the Legislature deliberately chose a statutorily defined term of art with well-established legal meaning, the legislative history shows intentional substitution of "great bodily injury" for "serious bodily injury" to expand public access, and minor injuries do not constitute great bodily injury under either definition.

The case is inapplicable when the records do not involve law enforcement investigatory files subject to CPRA exemptions, when the injuries are clearly minor or inconsequential that do not rise to "significant or substantial physical injury," or when dealing with criminal law contexts requiring proof beyond reasonable doubt rather than administrative disclosure determinations.

The case leaves open the specific factual determinations of whether particular K-9 bite injuries constitute great bodily injury in individual cases, whether the requested records are actually "investigatory" records subject to CPRA exemption, and the scope of City's obligation to conduct individualized review of each record rather than categorical withholding.