California Legal Brief

The Rule of Independent Office of Law Enforcement Review and Outreach v. Sonoma County Sheriff's Office is that Government Code section 25303.7 grants mandatory subpoena power to all sheriff oversight entities established by counties, under circumstances where the county has elected to create such an oversight entity within the meaning of the statute.

The Rule of West Contra Costa Unified School District is that a school district cannot claim impossibility as a defense to statutory teacher certification requirements until it has exhausted all statutory alternatives, including seeking waivers from the Commission on Teaching Credentialing or the State Board of Education, under circumstances where the district uses rolling substitutes instead of qualified permanent teachers in violation of statutory mandates.

The Rule of Pechkis v. Trustees of the California State University is that an anti-SLAPP motion to strike entire causes of action fails when the defendant does not identify with specificity how each claim underlying the causes of action arises from protected activity, under circumstances where the causes of action contain both protected and unprotected conduct.

The Rule of City of Fresno is that "great bodily injury" as used in Penal Code section 832.7(b)(1)(A)(ii) for California Public Records Act disclosure of law enforcement records means "a significant or substantial physical injury" as defined in Penal Code section 12022.7(f)(1), under circumstances where records relate to incidents involving use of force by police officers against persons.

The Rule of Benjamin Woodhouse v. The State Bar of California et al. is that trial courts have inherent authority to dismiss complaints that assert fantastic, delusional, or fanciful scenarios that have no arguable basis in law or fact, and may declare such plaintiffs vexatious litigants, under circumstances where the complaint presents allegations that no reasonable person would classify as within the realm of possibility.

The Rule of Bartholomew v. Parking Concepts is that collecting and maintaining individuals' ALPR information without implementing and making public the statutorily required policy harms these individuals by violating their right to know, under the California Automated License Plate Recognition Law (Civil Code sections 1798.90.5-1798.90.551).

The Rule of J.S. v. D.A. is that indigent inmates in bona fide civil actions that threaten their interests have a right to meaningful access to the courts to be heard in their defense, and trial courts must address and rule on such requests before proceeding without the inmate, under circumstances where an incarcerated defendant requests court assistance to participate in proceedings and the court has notice of the incarceration.

The Rule of The People v. T.B. is that "no less onerous alternatives" in Penal Code section 2679(b) refers to medical alternatives to the proposed organic therapy, not to alternative procedural methods of obtaining consent, under circumstances where an inmate patient lacks capacity to consent to electroconvulsive therapy and the court must authorize nonconsensual ECT.

The Rule of *People v. Alston* is that under Code of Civil Procedure section 231.7, a trial court must expressly explain its reasons on the record when ruling on an objection to a peremptory challenge, including making findings on whether presumptively invalid reasons were rebutted by clear and convincing evidence, under circumstances where the prosecutor's stated reasons for the challenge include distrust of law enforcement by a prospective juror who is a member of a cognizable group.

The Rule of Esparza v. The Superior Court of San Bernardino County is that incompetence to testify under Evidence Code section 701 may not be presumed from a prior grave disability finding under the LPS Act, under circumstances where a conservatorship has been established based on inability to provide for basic personal needs.

The Rule of Bartholomew v. Parking Concepts, Inc. is that collecting and using license plate information through an automated system without implementing and making publicly available the statutorily required usage and privacy policy constitutes "harm" under the ALPR Law sufficient to state a cause of action, under circumstances where an entity operates cameras and computer algorithms to automatically read and convert license plate images into computer-readable data.

The Rule of Sellers v. Superior Court is that to violate Health and Safety Code section 11362.3, subdivision (a)(4) (open container of marijuana in vehicle), marijuana must be of a usable quantity, in imminently usable condition, and readily accessible to an occupant, under circumstances where the marijuana could be consumed with minimal effort while driving, operating, or riding in the vehicle.

The Rule of People v. Aguilar is that a prosecutor's peremptory challenge based on alleged "juror confusion" is presumptively invalid under Code of Civil Procedure section 231.7, subdivision (g)(1)(C), and requires the trial court to confirm that the asserted confused behavior actually occurred based on the court's own observations, under circumstances where the prospective juror is perceived as a member of a protected group and gives clear, consistent answers regarding the legal concept in question.

The Rule of In re Lynex is that to obtain appointed counsel under the California Racial Justice Act, an indigent habeas petitioner need only plead a "plausible allegation" of a violation of Penal Code section 745(a), which is an "extremely low" and "minimal pleading requirement" that does not require a prima facie showing of entitlement to relief, under circumstances where the petitioner seeks counsel to prosecute racial bias claims in criminal proceedings.

The Rule of Microsoft Corporation v. Superior Court of Los Angeles County is that a trial court may issue a nondisclosure order prohibiting an electronic service provider from notifying its enterprise customer of a search warrant's existence, under circumstances where the court has reviewed a sealed affidavit and found that disclosure could cause adverse results enumerated in CalECPA, even when the provider proposes to notify only a "trusted contact" at the customer organization who is not the target of the investigation.

The Rule of Melissa I. Aerni et al. v. RR San Dimas, L.P., et al. is that Civil Code section 1940.1 does not require individualized proof that each plaintiff used a residential hotel as their own primary residence, under circumstances where plaintiffs seek class certification for violations of the statute's prohibition against the "28-day shuffle."