California Legal Brief

The Rule of J.N. et al. v. Jeffrey Goldberg is that a motion for Code of Civil Procedure section 128.7 sanctions must comply with statutory notice requirements by specifying the hearing date in the initial notice of motion to trigger the mandatory 21-day safe harbor period, under circumstances where the superior court's electronic Court Reservation System makes it impossible to obtain a hearing date more than three days in advance but the safe harbor period requires 21 days.

The Rule of Cardenas v. Los Angeles Unified School District is that appellate arguments are forfeited when the opening brief cites only to trial court briefing that itself contains no record citations, under circumstances where the appellate brief fails to provide direct citations to record evidence supporting factual assertions.

The Rule of In re Marriage of Nishida and Kamoda is that a family law fraud action filed timely in civil court and transferred to family law court may proceed on the merits rather than being dismissed for jurisdictional reasons, under circumstances where the plaintiff filed a civil complaint within the one-year discovery period of Family Code section 2122(a) and the case was properly transferred between departments of the same superior court.

The Rule of Raptors Are the Solution v. CropLife America is that trade associations that intervene in litigation to protect their members' direct pecuniary interests in government registration decisions are "opposing parties" liable for private attorney general fees under Code of Civil Procedure section 1021.5, under circumstances where the intervenors actively participate in defending challenged government approvals that directly affect their members' economic interests.

The Rule of Y.P. v. Wells Fargo & Co. is that a bank may be liable for negligent misrepresentation when its employee represents that a deposited check is valid and cleared without following the bank's own verification procedures, under circumstances where the depositor specifically inquires about the check's validity and legitimacy rather than merely funds availability.

The Rule of Chang v. Southern California Permanente Medical Group is that the "going and coming rule" applies to hybrid workers when they are commuting to their office on scheduled in-office days, even if they sometimes work from home, under circumstances where the employee's home is not a worksite on the day of the accident and the employee is engaged in an ordinary commute to their primary workplace.

The Rule of In re Marriage of Charles and Julie Ann Bowman is that trial courts retain discretion to consider Family Code factors including the losing party's ability to pay when determining the amount of attorney's fees under a prevailing party clause in a marital settlement agreement, under circumstances where the MSA contains a general attorney's fees provision without specific limitations on the court's consideration of equitable factors.

The Rule of Guinnane Construction Co. v. Chess is that the tort of another doctrine does not permit recovery of attorney fees incurred in litigating against the tortfeasor to recover fees awarded as damages, under circumstances where the plaintiff seeks to recover fees spent pursuing the tort action itself rather than fees incurred in third-party litigation necessitated by the tort.

The Rule of O'Leary v. Jones is that a party who obtains dismissal of a petition to confirm arbitration award on personal jurisdiction grounds is not a prevailing party under Civil Code section 1717 where the dismissal does not finally resolve the enforceability of the arbitration award and leaves the underlying contract dispute unresolved, under circumstances where the court expressly declines to rule on vacation of the award and the substantive claims may be pursued in another forum.

The Rule of NNN Capital Fund I, LLC v. Mikles is that lack of standing is a jurisdictional defect that can be raised for the first time on appeal and requires vacation of an arbitration award and remand for factual determination of standing, under circumstances where purported liquidating trustees may not have been properly elected under the company's operating agreement.

The Rule of Clapkin v. Levin is that a cross-complaint does not arise from protected litigation activity under Code of Civil Procedure section 425.16 when the claims are based on the defendant's unprotected business conduct that supplies the elements of liability, even where the cross-complaint references prior litigation for context and evidence, under circumstances where the same dispute would exist absent the litigation activity.

The Rule of Jacobs v. Papez is that an attorney may bring a single declaratory relief action against both the clients and a competing attorney lien claimant to enforce an attorney lien claim on settlement or judgment proceeds, under circumstances where the attorney obtained a recovery for clients and seeks to resolve competing lien claims without having to wait for other attorneys to first establish their liens in separate actions.

The Rule of Torres v. Munoz is that a court abuses its discretion by citing and relying on fictitious case authorities in its order, but a party forfeits the right to challenge such error when the party's own counsel drafted and submitted the order containing the fabricated citations without objecting or alerting the court to the fictitious nature of the authorities, under circumstances where the party had opportunity to verify citations and speak up before the court signed the order.

The Rule of Moramarco v. Nowakoski is that a trustee's inability to pay is not a mitigating factor that can reduce a Probate Code section 859 civil penalty for bad faith wrongful taking of trust property, under circumstances where a trustee attorney misappropriated trust funds and the statute provides mandatory double damages.

The Rule of Physicians for Social Responsibility – Los Angeles v. Department of Toxic Substances Control is that attorney fees cannot be awarded under the catalyst theory where a party has received a final adverse judgment on the merits before the defendant voluntarily provides the relief originally sought, under circumstances where the voluntary action occurs after the lawsuit has been fully litigated to a final judgment against the fee-seeking party.

The Rule of Benjamin Woodhouse v. The State Bar of California et al. is that trial courts have inherent authority to dismiss complaints that assert fantastic, delusional, or fanciful scenarios that have no arguable basis in law or fact, and may declare such plaintiffs vexatious litigants, under circumstances where the complaint presents allegations that no reasonable person would classify as within the realm of possibility.

The Rule of Haun v. Pagano is that a successful petitioner may recover attorney's fees under Welfare and Institutions Code section 15657.5(a) for prosecution of a financial elder abuse claim even when those fees are inextricably intertwined with defending against a competing elder abuse claim, under the circumstances where the petitioner is seeking fees as a prevailing plaintiff under the unilateral fee-shifting provision rather than as a prevailing defendant under a bilateral fee provision.

The Rule of Navellier v. Putnam is that parties to an appeal must promptly notify the appellate court of any bankruptcy filing that "could cause or impose a stay" of proceedings, even if they believe the stay does not apply, under Local Rule 21's mandatory disclosure requirements.

The Rule of Navellier v. Putnam is that appellate counsel must promptly notify the court of any party's bankruptcy that could potentially cause a stay under Local Rule 21, regardless of counsel's belief about whether the stay actually applies, under circumstances where the attorney knows about the bankruptcy filing.

The Rule of Viani v. Fair Oaks Estates, Inc. is that a costs judgment entered after a nonappealable voluntary dismissal without prejudice is not appealable as a final judgment when the appellant seeks to challenge underlying orders rather than the costs determination itself, under circumstances where allowing the appeal would constitute impermissible back-door review of nonappealable orders.

The Rule of Maynard Matthews et al. v. Patrick Ryan is that a section 998 settlement offer conditioned on consent by the defendant's insurance carrier is valid, under circumstances where the defendant is defended by an insurer whose consent is necessarily required for any settlement regardless of whether such consent is expressly stated in the offer.

The Rule of Higginson is that dismissal of a CLRA claim for failure to file a concurrent venue affidavit must be without prejudice (with leave to amend), not with prejudice, under Civil Code section 1780(d), and that unremedied discovery misuse that deprives a party of material evidence required for trial warrants a new trial and monetary sanctions, under circumstances where a party falsely verifies that responsive documents "never existed" and the court's remedial jury instruction becomes ineffective due to evidentiary exclusions.

The Rule of Hatlevig v. General Motors LLC is that a motion for attorney fees must be served within 180 days of when a case is voluntarily dismissed pursuant to court order, even when no formal dismissal order is filed until a later date, under circumstances where the case was deemed dismissed by operation of court rules after settlement.

The Rule of Monroe is that a state employee who service retires while under investigation for misconduct is ineligible for disability retirement benefits because the service retirement constitutes a complete severance of the employer-employee relationship, eliminating the necessary prerequisite for disability retirement—the right to return to service, under circumstances where the employee's departure was not related to a disabling medical condition and occurred during misconduct proceedings.

The Rule of In re Marriage of Hoch is that a family court abuses its discretion under Family Code section 271 by imposing sanctions against a party for refusing to stipulate to permit the opposing party to amend a petition from legal separation to dissolution of marriage, under circumstances where the refusal is based on conscientiously held religious beliefs and the moving party could have avoided the costs by initially filing a dissolution petition.

The Rule of Zand v. Sukumar is that an appellant cannot use the doctrine of voidness to collaterally attack a final appellate judgment by claiming trial court orders were void, when the challenged orders rest on errors that are merely in excess of jurisdiction rather than fundamental jurisdictional defects, under circumstances where the appellant has already appealed the underlying orders and lost.

The Rule of Amezcua v. Superior Court is that trial courts may not condition leave to amend pleadings on payment of opposing party's attorney fees unless specifically authorized by statute or agreement between parties, under Code of Civil Procedure section 473(a) which contains no attorney fee-shifting provision.

The Rule of Detrick v. Shimada is that a non-English speaking witness's declaration is inadmissible without foundational evidence of a qualified interpreter and attestation that the translation accurately reflects the witness's words, under circumstances where the witness cannot read, write, or speak English and provides no evidence of interpreter qualifications or translation accuracy.

The Rule of Nishida v. Kamoda is that a civil fraud action alleging misrepresentations during family law property settlement negotiations may be transferred to family law court rather than dismissed for jurisdictional reasons, and the action remains timely under Family Code section 2122 if filed within one year of discovering the fraud, under circumstances where the plaintiff files in civil court but the case is properly transferred to family law court.

The Rule of Gibbs v. County of Humboldt is that a public entity has mandatory statutory duties enforceable under Government Code section 815.6 to (1) maintain employee personnel records and allow inspection under Government Code section 31011 and Labor Code section 1198.5, and (2) timely enroll eligible employees in CalPERS under Government Code section 20283, under circumstances where the entity is a contracting agency with CalPERS and has failed to discharge these duties causing injury to the employee's retirement benefits.