The Rule of Hatlevig v. General Motors LLC is that a motion for attorney fees must be served within 180 days of when a case is voluntarily dismissed pursuant to court order, even when no formal dismissal order is filed until a later date, under circumstances where the case was deemed dismissed by operation of court rules after settlement.
Appeal from order denying motion for attorney fees in Superior Court, San Diego County.
Defendant Appellant was Matthew Hatlevig — the vehicle purchaser who sued for manufacturing defects and settled the case but failed to timely serve his attorney fees motion.
Plaintiff Respondent was General Motors LLC — the vehicle manufacturer who settled the defect case and opposed the untimely attorney fees motion.
The suit sounded in product defect/lemon law claims against a vehicle manufacturer. No cross-claims are described.
The key substantive facts leading to the suit were Hatlevig sued GM in February 2021 for defects in a vehicle he purchased in 2017, the parties settled with GM paying $100,000 and agreeing to pay court-determined attorney fees, and Hatlevig's counsel notified the court of settlement on June 2, 2023.
The procedural result leading to the Appeal: The trial court denied Hatlevig's motion for attorney fees as untimely, ruling that the case was dismissed on August 15, 2023, when no cause was shown why it should not be dismissed per the clerk's notice, and Hatlevig failed to serve the motion within 180 days of that dismissal date.
The key question(s) on Appeal: Whether the trial court erred in denying the motion for attorney fees because no dismissal had occurred and the time to appeal had not run at the time of the denial.
The Appellate Court held that a case is voluntarily dismissed for attorney fees timing purposes when it is deemed dismissed by court rule operation after settlement, regardless of when a formal dismissal order is later filed, and attorney fees motions must be served within 180 days of such dismissal.
The case is inapplicable when a formal dismissal order is timely filed, when good cause is shown to prevent dismissal after settlement notice, when the case does not settle, or when attorney fees are sought for post-judgment proceedings rather than trial court proceedings.
The case leaves open whether different timing rules might apply when the deemed dismissal date is calculated incorrectly by the court, and what constitutes sufficient "good cause" to prevent automatic dismissal after settlement.
Counsel
For Appellant: [Not determinable from opinion text], Cliff Dean Schneider
For Respondent: King & Spalding, Paul R. Johnson; Erskine Law Group, Mary Arens McBride, and Xylon D. Quezada