California Legal Brief

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Shear Development Co., LLC v. Cal. Coastal Com. 5/14/26 SC

Case No.: S284378M
Filed: April 23, 2026
Court: Supreme Court of California
Justices: Chief Justice Guerrero (author), Justices Corrigan, Liu, Kruger, Groban, Evans, and Stone
→ View Original Opinion (PDF)

The Rule of Shear Development Co. v. California Coastal Commission is that courts must exercise independent judgment when reviewing an agency's jurisdictional determinations based on legal interpretation of enacted law, and when two agencies offer conflicting interpretations of law they both administer, neither receives deference if Yamaha factors do not clearly favor one over the other, under circumstances where the jurisdictional question depends primarily on statutory or LCP interpretation rather than factual disputes.

Appeal from judgment after petition for writ of administrative mandate denied in Superior Court, San Luis Obispo County.

Petitioner Appellant was Shear Development Co., LLC — the property developer seeking coastal development permits to build single-family homes in Los Osos.

Respondent was California Coastal Commission — the state agency that exercised appellate jurisdiction over the County's permit approval and denied the development permit.

The suit sounded in administrative mandamus challenging agency jurisdiction. The County filed an amicus curiae brief supporting Shear's jurisdictional challenge.

The key substantive facts leading to the suit were Shear purchased eight residential lots in Los Osos in 2003, obtained permits to build four homes in 2004, built those homes, then in 2017 applied for permits to build four additional homes on the remaining lots. The County approved the permits in 2019, but two Commission members appealed to the Commission, which denied the permits in 2020, claiming appellate jurisdiction because (1) the development site was in a "sensitive coastal resource area" (SCRA) under the County's Local Coastal Program (LCP), and (2) single-family dwelling was not "the" principal permitted use but only one of three principal permitted uses for the site.

The procedural result leading to the Appeal: The trial court denied Shear's petition for writ of administrative mandate, ruling that the Commission had proper appellate jurisdiction because the development was located in an SCRA based on Figure 6-3 in the LCP, though the court rejected the Commission's alternative jurisdictional argument about principal permitted use.

The key question(s) on Appeal: 1. What standard of review applies when determining whether the Commission properly exercised appellate jurisdiction based on LCP interpretation? 2. When the Commission and local government offer conflicting LCP interpretations, which entity's interpretation receives deference? 3. Whether the proposed development site is located within the Los Osos Dune Sands Habitat SCRA under the LCP. 4. Whether the Commission has appellate jurisdiction when a development is for one of several principal permitted uses rather than the sole principal permitted use.

The Appellate Court held that courts must apply independent judgment review to jurisdictional questions involving legal interpretation of LCPs rather than substantial evidence review, that neither the Commission nor County receives deference when Yamaha factors do not clearly favor either entity's conflicting interpretation, that the development site is not located within an SCRA because the LCP designates the Los Osos Dune Sands Habitat as applying to rural areas outside the urban reserve line, and that the Commission lacks appellate jurisdiction over developments that constitute one of several designated principal permitted uses.

The case is inapplicable when the jurisdictional determination involves disputed questions of fact rather than pure legal interpretation, when only one agency administers the relevant law, when the development site is clearly designated as within an SCRA by unambiguous LCP language, or when a development is not designated as any principal permitted use under the LCP.

The case leaves open whether all SRAs automatically qualify as SCRAs for jurisdictional purposes, the impact of new LCP provisions that became effective during the appellate process, the application of these principles to other types of coastal development jurisdictional disputes, and the extent to which similar deference analysis applies when agencies disagree about interpretation of other types of enacted law.

Counsel

For Appellant: [Not determinable from opinion text]

For Respondent: [Not determinable from opinion text]

Amicus curiae: County of San Luis Obispo, [attorney names not determinable from opinion text]

Practice Area Tags

administrative law civil environmental real estate coastal development agency jurisdiction standard of review statutory interpretation land use zoning government liability appeal procedure independent judgment substantial evidence agency deference
This brief was generated by AI informed by the law practice of Ted Broomfield Law and has not been reviewed for accuracy. It is provided for informational purposes only and does not constitute legal advice.