California Legal Brief

The Rule of People v. Nelson is that a trial court may properly deny mental health diversion when it finds as trier of fact that the defendant's mental health disorders were not a significant factor in the commission of the charged offenses, under circumstances where the court expressly rejects expert testimony linking mental illness to criminal conduct and finds the defendant poses a public safety risk based on extensive criminal history.

Appeal from judgment after guilty plea in Superior Court, Santa Barbara County.

Defendant Appellant was Ryan Anthony Nelson — the recidivist defendant with seven prior prison sentences who pleaded guilty to commercial burglary and auto theft charges.

Plaintiff Respondent was The People — the prosecuting party opposing mental health diversion.

The suit sounded in criminal prosecution for commercial burglary and vehicle theft. No cross-claims applicable.

The key substantive facts leading to the suit were Nelson's commission of three counts of commercial burglary and one count of taking an automobile, with two prior strike convictions and an extensive criminal history including seven separate prison sentences for theft-related crimes.

The procedural result leading to the Appeal: The trial court denied defendant's motion for mental health diversion under Penal Code section 1001.36, ruling that despite Nelson's diagnoses of major neurocognitive disorder due to traumatic brain injury, major depressive disorder, PTSD, ADHD, and opioid-use disorder, there was "little to no evidence" his mental health diagnoses played any factor in the charged offenses, and that he posed an unreasonable danger to public safety based on his criminal history.

The key question(s) on Appeal: Whether the trial court abused its discretion in denying mental health diversion based on its factual finding that mental health disorders were not a significant factor in the commission of the crimes.

The Appellate Court held that the trial court properly exercised its discretion in denying mental health diversion where it made an express factual finding that the defendant's mental health disorders were not a significant factor in the charged offenses, even when rejecting expert psychological testimony, because the trial court as trier of fact has discretion to reject expert opinions and the appellant failed to establish an abuse of discretion.

The case is inapplicable when the trial court makes factual findings that mental health disorders were a significant factor in the commission of the offenses, when there is no extensive criminal history suggesting public safety risk, or when the defendant's crimes do not involve theft-related recidivism.

The case leaves open questions about the scope of trial court discretion to reject uncontradicted expert testimony in mental health diversion cases and the precise evidentiary standards for establishing that mental health disorders were a "significant factor" in criminal conduct.