California Legal Brief

The Rule of People v. Wilmot is that a trial court commits prejudicial error when it modifies a CALCRIM jury instruction to require that a killing be "unintentional" for voluntary manslaughter, under circumstances where the modification incorrectly suggests that an intentional killing in the heat of passion cannot qualify as voluntary manslaughter.

Appeal from judgment after jury trial in Superior Court, Los Angeles County.

Defendant Appellant was Steven J. Wilmot — the defendant who stabbed Franklin Washington to death near the Van Nuys police station during a dispute over fake methamphetamine.

Plaintiff Respondent was The People — the prosecution seeking murder conviction.

The suit sounded in criminal homicide (second degree murder).

The key substantive facts leading to the suit were Wilmot approached Washington at his tent at 3:44 a.m. demanding a $50 refund or replacement for fake methamphetamine Washington had sold him. Washington became hostile and threatening, brandishing what Wilmot believed was a knife and saying "I'm going to fucking kill you." After running away briefly, Wilmot returned and stabbed Washington once in the chest with a pocket knife, claiming he intended only "to injure him" out of anger and fear, not knowing the single thrust would be fatal through Washington's leather jacket.

The procedural result leading to the Appeal: The trial court modified CALCRIM No. 570 by adding a paragraph stating "If you find that Mr. Wilmot unintentionally killed Mr. Washington because of a sudden quarrel or in the heat of passion... you may find him guilty of voluntary manslaughter," underlining the word "unintentionally." The jury convicted Wilmot of second degree murder and acquitted him of first degree murder.

The key question(s) on Appeal: Whether the trial court's modification of CALCRIM No. 570 to require an "unintentional" killing for voluntary manslaughter constituted prejudicial instructional error that improperly restricted the jury's ability to convict of the lesser offense.

The Appellate Court held the trial court's modification constituted prejudicial legal error because it incorrectly implied that jurors should not find voluntary manslaughter if they believed Wilmot intentionally killed Washington in the heat of passion, when under People v. Lasko an intentional killing in the heat of passion can indeed be voluntary manslaughter, and substantial evidence supported a finding of reckless homicide warranting the lesser offense.

The case is inapplicable when the jury instruction modification does not restrict access to lesser included offenses, when there is no substantial evidence supporting a heat of passion theory, or when other jury instructions clearly and unambiguously cure any instructional error regarding the mental states required for voluntary manslaughter.

The case leaves open what specific language modifications to standard CALCRIM instructions might be permissible, how trial courts should properly instruct on the distinction between different mental states (purpose, knowledge, recklessness, negligence) in homicide cases, and whether similar "unintentional" language modifications to other jury instructions would constitute reversible error.