The Rule of People v. Taft is that when calculating presentence custody credit for noncontinuous periods of custody, the total days of actual confinement must be aggregated first, and then matching conduct credit calculated on that total, under circumstances where a defendant served time before probation was granted and additional time after probation was violated.
Appeal from judgment after probation revocation in Superior Court, Los Angeles County.
Defendant Appellant was Billy Arthur Taft, Jr. — the probationer whose felony probation was terminated and who received a previously suspended four-year state prison sentence.
Plaintiff Respondent was The People — the prosecuting entity seeking to enforce the probation violation and impose the suspended sentence.
The suit sounded in criminal prosecution for domestic violence and resisting arrest, with subsequent probation violation proceedings.
The key substantive facts leading to the suit were Taft's intoxicated assault on his girlfriend Sindy causing injuries requiring stitches, followed by his resistance to arrest that injured two sheriff's deputies. After pleading no contest to resisting an executive officer and corporal injury on a cohabitant, Taft received a suspended four-year prison sentence and was placed on probation with conditions to obey all laws and abstain from alcohol. He violated probation by being arrested for DUI and failing to comply with electronic alcohol monitoring.
The procedural result leading to the Appeal: The trial court terminated probation and imposed the four-year suspended prison sentence, awarding 398 total days of presentence custody credit by adding the original 269 days to 65 days confinement credit plus 64 days conduct credit. When notified of the miscalculation during appeal, the trial court agreed an error occurred but declined to correct it, ruling that it lacked jurisdiction to fix the custody credit calculation.
The key question(s) on Appeal: Whether Taft is entitled to two additional days of presentence custody credit and whether the trial court had jurisdiction under Penal Code section 1237.1 to correct the custody credit calculation after appeal was filed.
The Appellate Court held that presentence custody credit must be calculated by aggregating all actual confinement days (135 + 65 = 200 days) and then awarding matching conduct credit (200 days), for a total of 400 days rather than 398 days, and that trial courts retain jurisdiction under Penal Code section 1237.1 to correct custody credit calculations after a notice of appeal has been filed when the defendant requests correction in writing.
The case is inapplicable when the custody periods are continuous rather than noncontinuous, when the defendant has not exhausted remedies in the trial court by requesting correction, or when the appeal has concluded and remittitur has issued (jurisdiction after remittitur remains unclear).
The case leaves open whether section 1237.1 bestows jurisdiction on trial courts to correct custody credit errors after an appeal has concluded and remittitur has issued, as the court expressly noted this language is ambiguous.
Counsel
For Appellant: [Not determinable from opinion text], Robert L.S. Angres (appointed by Court of Appeal)
For Respondent: Attorney General's Office, Rob Bonta (Attorney General), Charles C. Ragland (Chief Assistant Attorney General), Susan Sullivan Pithey (Assistant Attorney General), Idan Ivri and Lauren N. Guber (Deputy Attorneys General)
Amicus curiae: None