California Legal Brief

The Rule of In re E.J. is that Penal Code section 29820, which prohibits minors adjudged wards of the juvenile court for specified offenses from possessing firearms until age 30, is facially constitutional under the Second and Fourteenth Amendments, under circumstances where the prohibition is based on a prior juvenile adjudication for qualifying criminal conduct.

Appeal from order denying motion in Superior Court, San Bernardino County.

Defendant Appellant was E.J. — a juvenile ward who committed assault with a deadly weapon other than a firearm and sought to terminate his firearm prohibition.

Plaintiff Respondent was The People — the prosecuting authority opposing termination of the firearm prohibition.

The suit sounded in juvenile delinquency proceedings and constitutional challenge to firearms restrictions. The case involved E.J.'s facial constitutional challenge to section 29820.

The key substantive facts leading to the suit were In 2018, E.J. was declared a ward of the juvenile court after admitting to assault with a deadly weapon other than a firearm. In 2019, his offense was reduced to a misdemeanor, his probation was terminated, he was discharged as a ward, and his record was sealed. In 2025, he filed a motion to terminate the firearm prohibition imposed under section 29820.

The procedural result leading to the Appeal: The trial court denied E.J.'s motion to terminate the firearm prohibition, ruling that section 29820 applied based on his prior juvenile adjudication.

The key question(s) on Appeal: 1. Whether section 29820 violates the Second Amendment because it does not conform to the nation's historical tradition of firearm regulation; 2. Whether section 29820 violates the Second Amendment by prohibiting firearm possession based solely on age as a proxy for dangerousness; 3. Whether section 29820 violates the Fourteenth Amendment by failing to provide due process through individualized assessment of dangerousness.

The Appellate Court held section 29820 is facially constitutional because: (1) juvenile offenders who have been adjudicated for criminal conduct are not among the "law-abiding citizens" protected by the Second Amendment's plain text, and firearm prohibitions for persons previously found to have engaged in criminal conduct are consistent with the nation's historical tradition of firearm regulation; (2) the statute does not impose age-based restrictions but rather uses age 30 as the endpoint for restrictions imposed based on prior criminal adjudications; and (3) due process does not require individualized dangerousness hearings where the statute is based on the fact of previous adjudication, not current dangerousness.

The case is inapplicable when the juvenile was not adjudicated for one of the predicate offenses specified in section 29820, or when challenging the statute as applied to specific individual circumstances rather than on its face.

The case leaves open whether section 29820 might be subject to successful as-applied challenges based on individual circumstances, and whether the Legislature might choose to provide mechanisms for individualized assessment of dangerousness.