(*Judge of the Orange County Superior Court, assigned by the Chief Justice pursuant to article VI, section 6 of the California Constitution)
The Rule of Semaan v. Mosier is that court-appointed receivers are protected by quasi-judicial immunity for their discretionary acts and decisions made in their capacity as receiver, under circumstances where the receiver must exercise judgment or discretion in performing their judicial functions.
Appeal from order granting anti-SLAPP motion in Superior Court, Orange County.
Plaintiff Appellants were Simon Semaan et al. — investment account holders whose assets were subject to criminal asset forfeiture proceedings.
Defendant Respondents were Robert P. Mosier et al. — court-appointed receiver in criminal prosecution who allegedly failed to liquidate investment accounts as ordered.
The suit sounded in breach of fiduciary duty.
The key substantive facts leading to the suit were that Mosier was appointed as receiver in a criminal prosecution charging Simon Semaan with workers' compensation insurance fraud. The court ordered Mosier to liquidate stock holdings "as soon as practicable," but Mosier failed to liquidate certain TDAmeritrade accounts, citing settlement negotiations and TDAmeritrade's requirements that would make him the beneficial owner. Mosier was relieved as receiver on February 3, 2022. Plaintiffs alleged damages of $1,180,854.95 from the decline in account values between December 8, 2021 and February 3, 2022.
The procedural result leading to the Appeal: The trial court granted Defendants' anti-SLAPP motion, ruling that Plaintiffs' claims arose from protected activity and that Plaintiffs could not show minimal merit because Mosier was protected by quasi-judicial immunity and the litigation privilege.
The key question(s) on Appeal: 1. Whether Plaintiffs' claims arose from protected activity under the anti-SLAPP statute; 2. Whether court-appointed receivers are entitled to quasi-judicial immunity for discretionary acts; 3. Whether determining when liquidation is "practicable" constitutes a discretionary rather than ministerial act.
The Appellate Court held that court-appointed receivers enjoy quasi-judicial immunity for discretionary acts and decisions made in their capacity as receiver, and that determining when liquidation is "practicable" under a court order requires the exercise of discretionary judgment, even if that judgment proves to be wrong.
The case is inapplicable when the receiver's conduct involves nondiscretionary, ministerial acts, intentional misconduct such as self-dealing, or actions taken outside the receiver's quasi-judicial capacity or in complete absence of jurisdiction.
The case leaves open whether receivers also enjoy immunity under Government Code section 820.2, and the precise boundaries of what constitutes discretionary versus ministerial acts for court-appointed receivers.
Counsel
For Appellant: Bunt & Shaver, David N. Shaver
For Respondent: Zelms, Erlich & Lenkov, Rinat Klier Erlich and Suzanna Harman
Amicus curiae: None