California Legal Brief

The Rule of Jessica M. is that section 3051's youth offender parole provisions do not unconstitutionally amend an initiative statute when the initiative made only technical restatements and clarifications to existing sentencing provisions without substantive changes, under circumstances where the challenged statutory provisions were not integral to accomplishing the electorate's goals in enacting the initiative.

The Rule of Shear Development Co. v. California Coastal Commission is that courts must exercise independent judgment when reviewing an agency's jurisdictional determinations based on legal interpretation of enacted law, and when two agencies offer conflicting interpretations of law they both administer, neither receives deference if Yamaha factors do not clearly favor one over the other, under circumstances where the jurisdictional question depends primarily on statutory or LCP interpretation rather than factual disputes.

The Rule of Colonial Manor, Inc. v. Vilma Reyes is that a surviving spouse who occupied a rent-controlled unit as a lawful occupant with the landlord's knowledge becomes an at-will tenant by implied agreement upon the original tenant's death and remains protected by local rent control ordinances, under circumstances where the spouse lived in the unit for at least one year before marriage, the landlord was aware of the occupancy, and no sublease agreement existed between the spouses.

The Rule of Bobo v. Appellate Division of the Superior Court is that a trial court abuses its discretion when denying misdemeanor diversion by relying solely on facts inherent in the qualifying offense without connecting them to the underlying purposes of the misdemeanor diversion statute, under circumstances where the charged offense is not specifically excluded from the diversion program.

The Rule of People v. Hardy is that assault weapons, short-barreled shotguns, large capacity magazines, and silencers are not protected "arms" under the Second Amendment, and regulations requiring firearm transfers through licensed dealers do not meaningfully constrain the right to keep and bear arms, under circumstances where defendants mount facial constitutional challenges to California's firearms restrictions.

The Rule of People v. Bertsch and Hronis is that a defendant's extreme religious beliefs alone do not render him mentally incompetent under Penal Code section 1367 if he is unwilling, rather than unable, to cooperate with counsel, under circumstances where the defendant understands the proceedings and can rationally assist in his defense despite his religious convictions.

The Rule of Myers v. Department of Motor Vehicles is that body-worn camera video evidence showing an officer failed to continuously observe a DUI suspect for 15 minutes before administering a chemical breath test successfully rebuts the Evidence Code section 664 presumption of compliance with Title 17 regulations, under circumstances where the video objectively demonstrates the officer left the suspect alone in a patrol car with doors closed during the observation period.

The Rule of People v. C.F. is that trial counsel renders ineffective assistance when failing to request a no-cost court reporter for a hearing on involuntary antipsychotic medication, under circumstances where the hearing provides the sole evidentiary basis for the court's order and the failure to secure a reporter is tantamount to waiver of the right to appeal.

The Rule of Western Manufactured Housing Communities Association v. City of Santa Rosa is that during a declared state of emergency, Penal Code section 396's definition of "rental price" for rent-controlled mobilehome spaces occupied at the time of the emergency declaration refers to the rental amount authorized under the local rent control ordinance at the time of the emergency declaration, not at any given time thereafter, and mobilehome park owners cannot "recoup" suppressed rent increases by using those increases as a baseline for post-emergency rent calculations, under circumstances where rent-controlled mobilehome spaces are subject to both local rent control ordinances and section 396's 10-percent cumulative cap during a multi-year emergency declaration.

The Rule of The People v. The Superior Court of Riverside County is that a former prosecutor must be disqualified from presiding over a Racial Justice Act evidentiary hearing when they were directly involved in making charging decisions and present at staffing meetings where homicide filing decisions were made during the relevant time period being analyzed for institutional bias, under circumstances where the judge's personal involvement in the decision-making process being scrutinized might cause an objective observer to reasonably doubt the judge's impartiality.

The Rule of Dawadi v. Adhikari is that check memo line annotations do not constitute sufficient written acknowledgment to revive a time-barred debt, under circumstances where the debtor explicitly refused to guarantee the debt, denied borrowing the money, and the annotations merely identify a payee for accounting purposes without constituting an unqualified admission of a subsisting obligation.

The Rule of The Retail Property Trust is that Revenue and Taxation Code section 170(a)(1) requires physical damage to property (whether direct or indirect) to qualify for reassessment relief, under circumstances where a property owner seeks disaster relief based on diminished property value from access restrictions alone without any physical harm to property.

The Rule of In re Sebastian C. is that placement in a family home with supervision and programming provided by a community-based agency can meet the requirements of a less restrictive program, under circumstances where the community-based nonresidential service program provides the programming and services rather than just the family home itself.

The Rule of Nargizyan is that an insurer cannot establish application of a "continuous or repeated seepage or leakage" policy exclusion based solely on the size of a pinhole leak and resulting water damage, without evidence of the actual duration of the leak, under circumstances where the insured discovered and immediately repaired the leak with no evidence of mold or long-term water accumulation.

The Rule of Waterford Property Company v. County of Orange is that a declaratory relief action challenging governmental tax assessments arises from protected activity under the anti-SLAPP statute when the claim relies upon the government entity's public statements, advocacy, petitioning activities, and official communications regarding the tax assessments, under circumstances where the plaintiff frames the dispute as involving broader public policy issues and relies on the government's protected speech to establish both the existence of an actual controversy and the need for declaratory relief.

The Rule of Y.P. v. Wells Fargo & Co. is that a bank may be liable for negligent misrepresentation when its employee represents that a deposited check is valid and cleared without following the bank's own verification procedures, under circumstances where the depositor specifically inquires about the check's validity and legitimacy rather than merely funds availability.

The Rule of Chang v. Southern California Permanente Medical Group is that the "going and coming rule" applies to hybrid workers when they are commuting to their office on scheduled in-office days, even if they sometimes work from home, under circumstances where the employee's home is not a worksite on the day of the accident and the employee is engaged in an ordinary commute to their primary workplace.

The Rule of Gonzalez v. Community Mortuary is that the affirmative defense of impracticability of performance is an equitable defense that must be decided by a judge, not a jury, under circumstances where a party seeks excuse from contract performance due to events making performance impracticable through no fault of their own.

The Rule of People v. Bradley is that the One Strike law permits only a single sentence per count based on qualifying circumstances, and the Habitual Sexual Offender law and One Strike law are alternative sentencing schemes requiring the trial court to choose only one, under circumstances where a defendant is convicted of qualifying sex offenses with multiple proven One Strike circumstances and prior convictions.

The Rule of Chi v. Department of Motor Vehicles is that a DMV hearing officer's combination of investigative and adjudicatory functions does not violate due process when the officer acts as a neutral fact-finder rather than as an advocate for the department, under circumstances where the officer introduces relevant evidence, asks clarifying questions, and rules on objections pursuant to a policy requiring neutrality.