California Legal Brief

The Rule of Findlay Grant et al. v. Chapman University is that a university's statements about class locations, campus facilities, and "face-to-face contact" requirements do not constitute sufficiently "specific" promises to create an enforceable implied contract for in-person education, under circumstances where the statements are general expectations rather than binding commitments and facilities descriptions contain express disclaimers.

The Rule of Esparza v. The Superior Court of San Bernardino County is that incompetence to testify under Evidence Code section 701 may not be presumed from a prior grave disability finding under the LPS Act, under circumstances where a conservatorship has been established based on inability to provide for basic personal needs.

The Rule of Bartholomew v. Parking Concepts, Inc. is that collecting and using license plate information through an automated system without implementing and making publicly available the statutorily required usage and privacy policy constitutes "harm" under the ALPR Law sufficient to state a cause of action, under circumstances where an entity operates cameras and computer algorithms to automatically read and convert license plate images into computer-readable data.

The Rule of Conservatorship of A.B. is that a person may be found presently gravely disabled if clear and convincing evidence shows they lack insight into their mental illness and will not take medication necessary to provide for basic needs without a court order, under circumstances where the evidence demonstrates a longstanding pattern of decompensating when not under mandatory medication orders despite repeated cycles of hospitalization.

The Rule of Fuentes v. Empire Nissan, Inc. is that a contract's format and illegibility generally do not support substantive unconscionability, but courts must closely scrutinize difficult-to-read contracts for unfair or one-sided terms when high procedural unconscionability exists, under circumstances where an employment arbitration agreement is presented in nearly illegible tiny print with minimal time for review.

The Rule of Committee for Tiburon LLC v. Town of Tiburon is that a program EIR for a local agency's general plan need not include site-specific environmental analysis of sites identified in the housing element where no housing project has been proposed for the site, under circumstances where the absence of project-specific details precludes informed review of environmental impacts and mitigation measures.

The Rule of Navellier v. Putnam is that parties to an appeal must promptly notify the appellate court of any bankruptcy filing that "could cause or impose a stay" of proceedings, even if they believe the stay does not apply, under Local Rule 21's mandatory disclosure requirements.

The Rule of People v. Heaps is that ex parte communications with a deliberating jury concerning a juror's ability to deliberate require reversal unless the prosecution proves harmless error beyond a reasonable doubt, under circumstances where the trial court fails to notify counsel of the jury's note raising competency concerns and the record does not establish how the jury resolved those concerns.

The Rule of Navellier v. Putnam is that appellate counsel must promptly notify the court of any party's bankruptcy that could potentially cause a stay under Local Rule 21, regardless of counsel's belief about whether the stay actually applies, under circumstances where the attorney knows about the bankruptcy filing.

The Rule of Brown v. Department of Motor Vehicles is that the Department of Motor Vehicles is not required to disclose the identity of a third-party reporter who initiates a driver reexamination proceeding, under circumstances where the reporter's form merely initiates the process but is not relied upon for the ultimate license suspension decision, the driver receives notice and hearing opportunities, and disclosure of the reporter's identity would compromise road safety by deterring future reports.

The Rule of Sellers v. Superior Court is that to violate Health and Safety Code section 11362.3, subdivision (a)(4) (open container of marijuana in vehicle), marijuana must be of a usable quantity, in imminently usable condition, and readily accessible to an occupant, under circumstances where the marijuana could be consumed with minimal effort while driving, operating, or riding in the vehicle.

The Rule of People v. Aguilar is that a prosecutor's peremptory challenge based on alleged "juror confusion" is presumptively invalid under Code of Civil Procedure section 231.7, subdivision (g)(1)(C), and requires the trial court to confirm that the asserted confused behavior actually occurred based on the court's own observations, under circumstances where the prospective juror is perceived as a member of a protected group and gives clear, consistent answers regarding the legal concept in question.

The Rule of Halperin v. Halperin is that a plaintiff cannot maintain a civil tort claim for intentional interference with expected inheritance (IIEI) when she has an adequate remedy available in probate, under circumstances where the plaintiff has standing in probate and the ability to seek relief based on the same factual allegations underlying the tort claim.

The Rule of **People v. Diaz** is that trial courts are not required to expressly state they have considered a defendant's youth when determining whether the defendant acted with express malice/intent to kill in section 1172.6 proceedings, under circumstances where the court is aware of the defendant's age and counsel argues youth as a mitigating factor but the court finds the defendant personally intended the victims' deaths.

The Rule of People v. Gomez is that use of animal imagery in criminal proceedings does not violate the Racial Justice Act when the animal reference is benign, endearing, and used solely to explain legal concepts rather than to dehumanize or exhibit racial bias, under circumstances where an objective observer would understand the comparison relates to the state of evidence rather than character traits.

The Rule of Viani v. Fair Oaks Estates, Inc. is that a costs judgment entered after a nonappealable voluntary dismissal without prejudice is not appealable as a final judgment when the appellant seeks to challenge underlying orders rather than the costs determination itself, under circumstances where allowing the appeal would constitute impermissible back-door review of nonappealable orders.

The Rule of Maynard Matthews et al. v. Patrick Ryan is that a section 998 settlement offer conditioned on consent by the defendant's insurance carrier is valid, under circumstances where the defendant is defended by an insurer whose consent is necessarily required for any settlement regardless of whether such consent is expressly stated in the offer.

The Rule of Conservatorship of B.K. is that an LPS Act conservatee may waive their jury trial right through counsel without a personal on-the-record advisement when the conservatee acknowledges awareness of the right and confirms the waiver choice, under circumstances where counsel has consulted with the conservatee, there is no suggestion counsel lacks authority or disregards the client's wishes, and the conservatee participates in the proceedings without objection.

The Rule of Department of Water Resources v. The Metropolitan Water District of Southern California is that a state agency's definition of a proposed program must be sufficiently definite to ascertain whether it qualifies as a statutory "modification" of an existing authorized project rather than a new unit requiring separate legislative approval, under circumstances where the agency seeks to validate revenue bonds based on broad definitional language that fails to establish clear boundaries or purposes for the proposed facilities.

The Rule of In re Lynex is that to obtain appointed counsel under the California Racial Justice Act, an indigent habeas petitioner need only plead a "plausible allegation" of a violation of Penal Code section 745(a), which is an "extremely low" and "minimal pleading requirement" that does not require a prima facie showing of entitlement to relief, under circumstances where the petitioner seeks counsel to prosecute racial bias claims in criminal proceedings.