California Legal Brief

The Rule of Bobo v. Appellate Division of the Superior Court is that a trial court abuses its discretion when denying misdemeanor diversion by relying solely on facts inherent in the qualifying offense without connecting them to the underlying purposes of the misdemeanor diversion statute, under circumstances where the charged offense is not specifically excluded from the diversion program.

Appeal from order denying petition for writ of mandate in Appellate Division of Superior Court, San Diego County.

Defendant Appellant was Aimee Bobo — the 50-year-old driver who ran a red light, collided with another vehicle, and killed the other driver while driving negligently.

Plaintiff Respondent was The People — the prosecution opposing Bobo's request for misdemeanor diversion under Penal Code section 1001.95.

The suit sounded in criminal vehicular manslaughter (misdemeanor). Bobo sought pretrial diversion which the prosecution opposed.

The key substantive facts leading to the suit were that on November 11, 2024, Bobo drove through a red light a few seconds after it turned red, striking a Toyota Highlander making a left turn and killing the driver, Mary Donato. Bobo appeared in shock, told police she thought she had the green light, showed no signs of intoxication, and had no prior criminal record. She was charged with misdemeanor vehicular manslaughter and requested pretrial diversion for 18 months with conditions including traffic courses, community service, and restitution.

The procedural result leading to the Appeal: The trial court found Bobo eligible for diversion but denied it as unsuitable, ruling that her negligent conduct caused another person's death. The appellate division summarily denied her petition for writ of mandate.

The key question(s) on Appeal: Whether the trial court abused its discretion in denying misdemeanor diversion by relying solely on the fact that defendant's negligent conduct caused death, which is inherent in the charged offense of misdemeanor vehicular manslaughter.

The Appellate Court held that the trial court abused its discretion by denying diversion based solely on facts inherent in the qualifying offense (death resulting from negligent driving) without connecting those circumstances to the rehabilitative purposes of the misdemeanor diversion statute, where misdemeanor vehicular manslaughter is not excluded from the statutory diversion program.

The case is inapplicable when the charged misdemeanor is specifically excluded under Penal Code section 1001.95(e) (registrable sex offenses, certain domestic violence offenses, stalking), when the trial court connects the offense circumstances to legitimate concerns about rehabilitation prospects under the statute's purposes, or when the denial is based on factors beyond mere commission of the charged offense.

The case leaves open whether victim family opposition alone could justify denial of diversion, what specific factors beyond offense elements would justify denial while remaining consistent with the statute's purposes, and the proper weight to give victim impact when it conflicts with legislative diversion policy.