The Rule of The People v. The Superior Court of Riverside County is that a former prosecutor must be disqualified from presiding over a Racial Justice Act evidentiary hearing when they were directly involved in making charging decisions and present at staffing meetings where homicide filing decisions were made during the relevant time period being analyzed for institutional bias, under circumstances where the judge's personal involvement in the decision-making process being scrutinized might cause an objective observer to reasonably doubt the judge's impartiality.
Appeal from order denying amended statement of disqualification in Superior Court, Riverside County.
Petitioner was The People of the State of California — seeking disqualification of Judge Shouka from presiding over Russell Austin's Racial Justice Act evidentiary hearing.
Respondent was The Superior Court of Riverside County — the court that denied the disqualification request.
Real Party in Interest was Russell Austin — defendant charged with first degree murder and facing the death penalty who filed a claim under the California Racial Justice Act alleging the District Attorney's Office seeks death penalty more frequently against Black defendants.
The suit sounded in criminal law involving a petition for extraordinary writ challenging judicial disqualification.
The key substantive facts leading to the suit were Judge Shouka was a former deputy district attorney in the Riverside County homicide unit from 2015-2018, where she made charging recommendations, was present at staffing meetings where homicide charging decisions were discussed, and was involved in at least 28 cases during the relevant time period. Austin filed an RJA motion claiming the DA's office discriminatorily seeks death penalty against Black defendants, requiring analysis of charging patterns during Judge Shouka's tenure at the DA's office.
The procedural result leading to the Appeal: The trial court denied the People's amended statement of disqualification against Judge Shouka, ruling that the People failed to meet their burden to show facts requiring disqualification and that none of their contentions appeared logically related to Judge Shouka's impartiality.
The key question(s) on Appeal: Whether Judge Shouka should be disqualified under Code of Civil Procedure section 170.1, subdivision (a)(6)(A)(iii), where a person aware of the facts might reasonably entertain a doubt that she would be able to be impartial in presiding over an RJA evidentiary hearing examining the very charging decisions she participated in as a prosecutor.
The Appellate Court held that disqualification was required because Judge Shouka was directly involved in making charging decisions and was present at staffing meetings where homicide filing decisions were made during the relevant period, and a person aware of these facts might reasonably entertain a doubt as to whether she could be impartial in determining if the DA's office had a pattern of institutional bias when she was personally involved in those decisions.
The case is inapplicable when a former prosecutor judge was not directly involved in making charging decisions or developing office policy, but merely followed office policy like any other line prosecutor, or when there is insufficient evidence of the judge's personal involvement in cases or decisions being scrutinized in the RJA motion.
The case leaves open how RJA evidentiary hearings will be conducted given the recent enactment of the statute, what level of former prosecutorial involvement would require disqualification in other contexts, and the standards for disqualification under Code of Civil Procedure section 170.1, subdivisions (a)(1)(A) and (a)(2)(A) which the court did not address.
Counsel
For Petitioner: Michael A. Hestrin, District Attorney, Emily R. Hanks and W. Matthew Murray, Deputy District Attorneys
For Respondent: No appearance
For Real Party in Interest: Steven L. Harmon, Public Defender, Brian G. Cosgrove and Allison Lowe, Deputy Public Defenders