California Legal Brief

The Rule of People v. Molina is that different sex offender registration requirements for defendants convicted under Penal Code section 288(c)(1) versus section 288(a) do not violate equal protection where there is a rational basis for the disparity, under rational basis review where lifetime registration for section 288(c)(1) offenders (who must be at least 24 years old with a 10-year age gap) can be rationally distinguished from tier two registration for section 288(a) offenders.

Appeal from order denying petition to terminate sex offender registration in Santa Clara County Superior Court.

Defendant Appellant was Arthur Molina — convicted sex offender seeking termination of mandatory lifetime registration after 20+ years.

Plaintiff Respondent was The People — opposing termination based on statutory ineligibility for tier three registrants.

The suit sounded in sex offender registration law under Penal Code section 290.5.

The key substantive facts leading to the suit were Molina sustained a 2001 felony conviction under section 288(c)(1) for lewd conduct with a child 14-15 years old when he was at least 10 years older, requiring lifetime tier three registration. In 2022, his conviction was reduced to a misdemeanor but remained tier three. Molina petitioned to terminate registration, arguing equal protection violation compared to section 288(a) offenders who receive tier two registration with possible termination after 20 years.

The procedural result leading to the Appeal: The trial court denied the petition to terminate registration, ruling that Molina was statutorily ineligible as a tier three registrant and that the lifetime registration requirement did not violate equal protection based on binding precedent in Legg v. Department of Justice.

The key question(s) on Appeal: Whether different registration requirements for section 288(c)(1) offenders (lifetime tier three) versus section 288(a) offenders (tier two with possible termination) violate equal protection guarantees.

The Appellate Court held that no equal protection violation exists because a rational basis supports the different treatment, specifically that the Legislature could rationally conclude that section 288(c)(1) offenders (minimum age 24 with 10-year age gap) are less likely to reform than section 288(a) offenders and present greater risk of predatory behavior against sexually naive children.

The case is inapplicable when the challenged classification lacks any conceivable rational basis, when strict or intermediate scrutiny applies, or when the Legislature changes the statutory framework to reclassify section 288(c)(1) offenses to tier two status.

The case leaves open whether future legislative changes based on CASOMB recommendations might alter the registration requirements, and what standard would apply to equal protection challenges involving suspect classes or fundamental rights in the sex offender registration context.