California Legal Brief

The Rule of Beale v. Department of Motor Vehicles is that the DMV cannot suspend a driver's license for refusing to take a blood alcohol test while riding an electric bicycle, under circumstances where the rider was operating an electric bicycle (not a motor vehicle) and arrested under Vehicle Code sections that do not apply to bicyclists.

Appeal from judgment after denial of petition for writ of mandate in Santa Clara County Superior Court.

Plaintiff Appellant was David Keith Beale — the electric bicycle rider whose driver's license was administratively suspended by the DMV for refusing a blood alcohol test.

Defendant Respondent was Department of Motor Vehicles — the state agency that conducted the APS hearing and suspended Beale's license.

The suit sounded in administrative law/writ of mandate. Beale also raised a due process challenge to the APS hearing process.

The key substantive facts leading to the suit were Beale was riding a Class 2 electric bicycle when he crashed, appeared intoxicated to Officer Corini, refused field sobriety tests and preliminary alcohol screening, was arrested for Vehicle Code section 23152 violation (driving under influence), refused blood/breath test under implied consent law, had blood drawn by warrant showing 0.113% BAC, and received license suspension order from DMV.

The procedural result leading to the Appeal: The trial court denied the petition for writ of mandate, ruling that bicyclists are subject to the same rules as drivers of vehicles under Vehicle Code section 21200, making the distinction between electric bicycles and motor vehicles irrelevant, and that the APS hearing did not violate due process.

The key question(s) on Appeal: 1) Whether an electric bicycle qualifies as a "motor vehicle" under Vehicle Code section 13353 for purposes of administrative license suspension; 2) Whether the Vehicle Code's license suspension provisions apply to electric bicycle riders who refuse chemical testing.

The Appellate Court held that Vehicle Code section 24016 expressly states "an electric bicycle is not a motor vehicle," this specific provision takes precedence over the general motor vehicle definition in section 415, and section 13353's license suspension authority requires the person to have been driving a "motor vehicle," which does not include electric bicycles.

The case is inapplicable when the rider is operating a true motor vehicle (such as a moped or motorized bicycle as defined in Vehicle Code section 406), when the rider is operating a regular non-electric bicycle, or when different Vehicle Code provisions specifically applicable to bicycles are at issue.

The case leaves open whether similar due process challenges to APS hearings might succeed on their merits, how these principles might apply to other types of motorized devices that fall into gray areas of the Vehicle Code definitions, and whether the Legislature might choose to modify the statutory scheme to include electric bicycles in license suspension provisions.