The Rule of People v. Tyus is that at a Penal Code section 1172.6 evidentiary hearing, the prosecution must prove beyond a reasonable doubt that a petitioner is guilty of murder under current law—it is not the petitioner's burden to prove an alternate murder theory existed, under circumstances where the petitioner has established a prima facie case for relief and was not the actual killer.
Appeal from order granting petition for resentencing under Penal Code section 1172.6 in Superior Court, San Bernardino County.
Plaintiff Appellant was The People — the prosecution seeking to uphold defendant's voluntary manslaughter conviction.
Defendant Respondent was Leroy Tyus Jr. — a gang member who at age 15 accompanied the actual shooter to what he believed was a debt collection but resulted in murder.
The suit sounded in criminal law regarding resentencing under Senate Bill 1437's amendments limiting imputed malice theories of murder liability.
The key substantive facts leading to the suit were that in 2006, 15-year-old Tyus accompanied Kevin Roach to collect money, believing it was debt collection. During a brief car ride, Roach told Tyus they were going to collect money. Tyus had no weapon and saw no gun. When they approached apartments, Roach sped ahead and shot victim Dustin Diaz while Tyus stood 10-20 feet away. Tyus testified he did not know they were going to shoot anyone and believed it was debt collection. In 2010, Tyus pled guilty to voluntary manslaughter, stating he did so because he believed he could have been convicted of murder under felony murder or natural and probable consequences theories.
The procedural result leading to the Appeal: The trial court granted Tyus's section 1172.6 petition and dismissed the case entirely, ruling that the People failed to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that Tyus was guilty of murder under current law, and finding no remaining charges to sentence on.
The key question(s) on Appeal: 1. Whether the trial court erred in finding the People failed to prove Tyus guilty of murder under current law as a direct aider and abettor 2. Whether the trial court erred in dismissing the case rather than redesignating the conviction under section 1172.6, subdivision (e)
The Appellate Court held the trial court correctly found the People failed to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that Tyus had intent to kill required for direct aiding and abetting murder, given his testimony that he believed he was participating in debt collection, but the court erred in dismissing the case rather than redesignating his manslaughter conviction as attempted robbery under section 1172.6, subdivision (e).
The case is inapplicable when the defendant was the actual killer, when there is compelling evidence of intent to kill that leaves no room for judicial determination of insufficiency, when the People clearly retract any concession of prima facie case before the evidentiary hearing, or when underlying felonies are specifically charged in the original case.
The case leaves open what specific factual showing would be required to prove intent to kill in similar accomplice scenarios, the precise boundaries of what constitutes sufficient evidence to compel a finding in the prosecution's favor on appeal, and how courts should handle cases where multiple potential underlying felonies could serve as the basis for redesignation.
Counsel
For Appellant: Jason Anderson, District Attorney, and Sean W. Daugherty, Deputy District Attorney
For Respondent: Ava R. Stralla, under appointment by the Court of Appeal