California Legal Brief

The Rule of People v. Cardenas is that a trial court must allow a defendant who exercises his or her right to a jury trial under Penal Code section 1170, subdivision (b)(2) the opportunity to argue to the jury what findings it should make as to alleged aggravating circumstances, under circumstances where the defendant has asserted the right to jury trial on aggravating factors that could be used to impose an upper term sentence.

Appeal from judgment after jury trial in Superior Court, Los Angeles County.

Defendant Appellant was Jose Bustamant Cardenas — the defendant who shot and killed a 15-year-old during an attempted cell phone theft and was denied the right to argue aggravating factors to the jury.

Plaintiff Respondent was The People — the prosecution seeking to impose upper term sentencing based on aggravating factors.

The suit sounded in criminal prosecution for murder with firearm enhancement allegations. The case involved aggravating sentencing factors under the determinate sentencing scheme.

The key substantive facts leading to the suit were Cardenas shot and killed 15-year-old Joshua Simmons when Simmons tried to steal his cell phone during a prearranged sale meeting. Cardenas emptied his gun magazine at Simmons as he fled, firing six shots. Simmons fell and said "I'm sorry" before dying. Cardenas claimed self-defense, believing Simmons might be armed.

The procedural result leading to the Appeal: The trial court denied defense counsel's request to argue aggravating factors to the jury during the sentencing phase, ruling that closing arguments were not required for jury findings on aggravating circumstances.

The key question(s) on Appeal: 1. Whether denial of closing argument on aggravating sentencing factors violates the Sixth Amendment right to assistance of counsel 2. Whether such error constitutes structural error or is subject to harmless error analysis under Chapman v. California

The Appellate Court held that trial courts must allow defendants to argue aggravating factors to juries in sentencing proceedings, and the denial of this right was not harmless beyond a reasonable doubt given the jury's verdict of voluntary manslaughter rather than murder suggested they found defendant's testimony at least partly credible regarding his fear and perception of threat.

The case is inapplicable when the defendant does not assert the right to jury trial on aggravating factors, when aggravating circumstances are stipulated to by the defendant, or when the court completely denies all closing argument rather than limiting argument to specific topics.

The case leaves open whether denial of closing argument on sentencing factors constitutes structural error requiring automatic reversal, as the court found prejudice under the Chapman harmless error standard without deciding the structural error question.