The Rule of In re Marriage of Jenkins is that a default judgment in dissolution proceedings that awards specific property division relief exceeds the relief requested where the dissolution petition listed all property division issues as "To be determined," under circumstances where the defaulted party lacked proper notice of the prove-up hearing and the specific property division being sought.
Appeal from order setting aside default judgment in Superior Court, Contra Costa County.
Defendant Appellant was Katia X. Jenkins — the petitioning spouse who obtained a default judgment awarding her the family residence and other specific property divisions.
Plaintiff Respondent was James M. Jenkins — the defaulted spouse who moved to set aside the default judgment claiming lack of notice and that the judgment exceeded the relief requested in the petition.
The suit sounded in marital dissolution. No cross-claims were applicable.
The key substantive facts leading to the suit were: After 22+ years of marriage, Katia filed a dissolution petition in January 2021 listing all property division matters as "TBD." The family residence had been James's separate property, but he added Katia to title as community property in 2020. James failed to respond to the petition. Katia later obtained counsel and sought default judgment with specific property awards, including awarding her the residence subject to equalizing payments to James totaling over $440,000.
The procedural result leading to the Appeal: The trial court granted James's motion to set aside the default judgment (except as to marital status termination), ruling that James lacked proper notice of the default prove-up hearing and that the judgment exceeded the relief requested in the "TBD" petition under Code of Civil Procedure section 580 and Family Code sections 2121-2122.
The key question(s) on Appeal: 1) Whether a default judgment adjudicating specific property division issues exceeded the relief requested in a dissolution petition that listed all property matters as "TBD," warranting vacatur under Code of Civil Procedure section 580; and 2) Whether the family court's finding that James lacked notice of the default judgment proceedings warranted vacatur under Family Code sections 2121 and 2122 on grounds of mistake.
The Appellate Court held that both Code of Civil Procedure section 580 and Family Code sections 2121-2122 applied to support setting aside the default judgment, where the judgment awarded specific property division relief that went beyond the "TBD" placeholder language in the petition and James lacked proper notice due to clerical errors in hearing dates and service at an incorrect address.
The case is inapplicable when the dissolution petition specifically identifies the property to be divided and requests the specific relief granted in the default judgment, or when proper notice of the default prove-up hearing is provided to the defaulted party.
The case leaves open the precise level of specificity required in dissolution petitions to satisfy Code of Civil Procedure section 580, and whether the Andresen case allowing "TBD" designations should be limited to cases where property declarations with specific items are attached to the petition.
Counsel
For Appellant: Oliveri Law, Meghan E. Oliveri
For Respondent: Law Office of Stephanie J. Finelli, Stephanie J. Finelli
Amicus curiae (if any): [Not determinable from opinion text]